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ABSTRACT
TRAPPED IN THE TIEBOUT MODEL—
THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL AFFORDABLE HOUSING PROGRAMS
ON MIGRATION OF WEALTHIER RESIDENTS
Yu-Chih Lin
September 18, 2015
Housing mobility programs have been implemented in America since the 1990s to solve
poverty concentration and to improve the economic self-sufficiency of low-income
families through housing subsidies. This policy was based on the assumption that
mixed-income neighborhoods provide better resources and opportunities to low-income
families so that program participants who relocate to low-poverty neighborhoods improve
their economic status. Currently, few studies examine the effectiveness of housing
mobility programs under a decentralized fiscal system. Specifically, the migration of
program participants may stimulate Tiebout’s vote-with-feet mechanisms and may limit
the duration of the newly-created mixed-income environment, leaving poverty
concentration and poverty unsolved. This research uses a dynamic economic model to
analyze the impacts of housing mobility programs on local taxes and public goods in both
the sending and receiving municipalities and the impacts of this change on further
migration of different economic classes. An ANOVA model and a MANCOVA model
were used to support the findings from the economic model. The ANOVA results indicate
that residents of higher-poverty municipalities did not pay more taxes for welfare and

v

health than residents of lower-poverty municipalities did because the expenses mostly
came from intergovernmental funds. However, the MANCOVA results show that the
percentage of population growth between 2000 and 2012 in the low-poverty
municipalities with more low-income affordable housing program participants was still
significantly smaller than that in the low-poverty municipalities with no/fewer
low-income affordable housing program participants. These findings accord with the
dynamic economic model, which suggests that even if the non-poor living with the poor
do not pay more taxes for the public goods used exclusively by the poor, like welfare and
health, further migration may still occur under a decentralized fiscal system. Property
taxation requires wealthier residents to pay more for each unit of other nonexclusive
public goods than the poor do. The research implies that funding anti-poverty programs at
the local level rather than the national level may stimulate the out-migration of wealthier
residents. As wealthier residents exit the newly mixed-income municipalities, poverty
may re-concentrate, limiting the effectiveness of housing mobility programs.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This research adopts an economic perspective to review how political fragmentation
may result in urban problems, how these problems were exacerbated by federal housing
and transportation policies, and how the federal government adopted housing mobility
programs to solve these problems. The goal of this research is to analyze whether housing
mobility programs could successfully solve the problems. This chapter briefly introduces
the background, research question, purpose, dynamic economic model of urban migration,
and statistical models in this research.

Background
Tiebout (1956) argued that political fragmentation can promote the efficiency of
public good provision because each local government has to be effective and efficient to
attract people to live in its jurisdiction. However, this theory has three problematic
assumptions: the implicit assumption of head taxation1, full mobility, and no positive or
negative externalities. In reality, property taxation is more widely adopted than head
taxation. Property taxation has redistributive nature, which makes individuals tend to
move to wealthier communities (Aronson & Schwartz, 1973). To eliminate the externality
of the poor’s in-migration, local governments may adopt density zoning to prevent the
1

Although this assumption is not directly written in Tiebout’s article, Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986)
found that head taxation is necessary to achieve the efficiency mentioned in the Tiebout model.

1

poor who lack economic mobility from voting with their feet (Hamilton, 1975). On the
other hand, externalities also make local governments compete with each other in order to
keep or attract capital (Bayindir-Upmann, 1998). Therefore, political fragmentation may
cause economic segregation, overprovision of public goods for wealthier people, and
underprovision of public goods for people in poverty. Besides fewer and inferior public
goods, municipalities with poverty concentration may suffer from several other
disadvantages, such as disease, high crime rates, unemployment, and violence (W. J.
Wilson, 1997).
The problem of poverty concentration and its related social problems were
exacerbated by federal policies. Federal housing and transportation policies, which
subsidized those who can afford a house or a car rather than subsidized renters or those
who rely on public transportation, widened the gap between wealthier people and the
poor, making the poor less mobile and wealthier people more mobile. Moreover, these
policies, which provided more housing mortgages to suburbs than to cities and
constructed beltway, encouraged people who can afford a house and car to live in suburbs,
thus shaping the spatial pattern of the urban poor and the suburban rich (Dreier,
Mollenkopf, & Swanstrom, 2004: 115-116, 121-122). This spatial pattern reduced urban
poor’s accesses to manufacturing, retail, and other low-skilled jobs in suburbs. In sum,
these policies made the reality deviate from the assumptions of full mobility and no
externalities even further, thus exacerbating the problems.

Research question
Supported by considerable scholarship, the federal government attempted to break
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the economic segregation by subsidizing housing to disperse low-income families into
wealthier neighborhoods with greater opportunities and resources (Imbroscio, 2008: 111).
This residential mobility was expected to help low-income families achieve economic
mobility because these families would have access to the jobs in suburbs, a higher level of
public goods, and more opportunities to associate with the middle class, who may help
expand their occupational and social networks. However, considerable scholars indicated
that most program participants did not moved to low-poverty neighborhoods (Crump,
2003; DeLuca, Garboden, & Rosenblatt, 2013; Edin, DeLuca, & Owens, 2012; Finkel &
Buron, 2001; Goering, Feins, & Richardson, 2003: 14; Goetz, 2004; Goetz & Chapple,
2010; Imbroscio, 2012). These programs, which failed to relocate participants to
low-poverty neighborhoods, cannot accurately test the effectiveness of the approach of
relocating the poor to better neighborhoods.
This research defines housing mobility programs as the programs which successfully
relocated low-income families to low-poverty localities by subsidizing housing.
Unfortunately, even though low-income families were relocated to low-poverty
neighborhoods, little empirical evidence showed significant difference in economic
self-sufficiency between the group who moved to low-poverty neighborhoods and the
group who stayed at high-poverty neighborhoods (Hanratty, McLanahan, & Pettit, 2003;
Katz, Kling, & Liebman, 2000, 2003; Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn, 2003; Sanbonmatsu et
al., 2012; Shroder, 2002). ClampetLundquist and Massey (2008) argued that the
mechanisms to improve employment outcomes take time to operate, so they use duration,
namely months each movers stay in non-poverty neighborhoods (below 20 percent), as an
independent variable and found that duration was positively associated with the odds of
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being employed.
Although this positive individual outcome implied that housing mobility programs
might be effective, it is still unclear whether this positive impact will last in the long term.
Duration of the poor staying in low-poverty neighborhoods depends on not only the
residential mobility of the low-income families but also the residential decisions of the
middle class. Since housing mobility programs highly relied on the positive impacts of
mixed-income neighborhoods, or, to be more specific, the middle class, on the outcomes
of low-income families, this research intends to analyze migration of different economic
classes after housing mobility programs were adopted in order to reveal whether or not
housing mobility programs’ expected positive impacts will exist in the long term.

Purpose
Considering that housing mobility programs did not change the nature of political
fragmentation by adopting supporting measures in receiving localities, this research
argues that the effectiveness of housing mobility programs needs to be reexamined in the
framework of political fragmentation because Tiebout's voting mechanism (1956) may
still work. Since people have to pay tax to local governments and use local public goods
provided by local governments, the in-migration of low-income families undoubtedly
will affect the local tax revenue and the level of local public goods in receiving localities.
The out-migration of low-income families will also affect the local taxes and public
goods in sending localities. Based on the Tiebout model, the changes of local taxes and
public goods may cause further migration.
Therefore, the main goal of this research is to create a dynamic economic model of

4

urban migration to analyze the long-term impacts of housing mobility programs on
sending municipalities, receiving municipalities, and the people who live in one of those
municipalities. The Tiebout model is not appropriate for the analysis because of its three
unrealistic assumptions. To remove these assumptions, the dynamic economic model
adopts property taxation for analysis, allows people to make residential decisions
whenever people move in or out in order to reflect externalities, and assumes that housing
mobility programs improve the residential mobility of low-income persons. Also, most
economic models related to Tiebout’s theory are static models while this research
attempts to create a dynamic model because any migration may become a driver of
further migration. Last, instead of analyzing the impact of housing mobility programs on
either individual outcomes or receiving localities, the economic model in this research
includes both impacts by analyzing how housing mobility programs affect the bundle of
taxes and public goods in receiving municipalities and thus cause further migration,
which may further affect the long-term individual outcomes of program participants.
Since municipalities are the smallest geographical unit with the power to decide its own
tax rate and public goods, the analysis unit in this research is municipalities.

Dynamic economic model of urban migration
Unlike most previous economic migration models which are based on utility
maximization, the dynamic model in this research borrows the concept of “dissatisfaction”
from literature of sociology to explain migration. This concept implies that people will
not move to other location as long as they are satisfied with their current location, even if
they know they would be better off in other jurisdictions (Ellen, 2000: 105). Therefore,
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instead of comparing the utility of different municipalities, this dynamic model compares
people’s economic surplus in the same municipality before and after some people move
in or out to analyze whether people have motivation to move.
The model helps to reveal a possible outcome if the federal government promotes
greater mobility. The federal government has been historically and currently funding
assisted housing to improve the residential mobility of low-income families. The
approach of promoting greater mobility is still supported by many urban scholars. This
approach indeed make reality more accord with Tiebout’s full mobility assumption, but
externalities and property taxation still have effects under a decentralized fiscal system.
Residents can still be attracted by other municipalities if they do not satisfy the living
environment of their current residences. And property taxation still has redistributive
nature. This economic model analyzed the effects of externalities and property taxation
and revealed a possible cycle of providing greater mobility without supporting measures:
The federal government dispersed the poor, the poor moved, the non-poor in receiving
municipalities out-migrated in the long term, receiving municipalities suffered from
poverty concentration and poverty, and the federal government had to disperse the poor
again to solve the same old problem in different municipalities.

Statistical models to test the hypotheses
The first statistical model, analysis of variance (ANOVA), is used to compare the
non-poor’s expenditure on health and welfare between the two groups—low-poverty
municipalities (below 15 percent) and high-poverty municipalities (above 25 percent).
The dynamic economic model does not distinguish different types of public goods;
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however, there are public goods that are used exclusively by the poor, like health and
welfare. Therefore, ANOVA is used to test the null hypothesis that the non-poor in
high-poverty municipalities pay the same for public welfare and health as the non-poor in
low-poverty municipalities do. The result can show whether people living with the poor
have to pay extra welfare expenditure besides subsidizing the poor on other nonexclusive
public goods through property taxation. If data reject the null hypothesis, it means that
the dynamic process predicted by the economic model may happen more or less quickly.
The second statistical model, multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA), is
used to analyze the out-migration of non-poor population between two groups—
low-poverty municipalities with no/few low-income affordable housing program
participants and low-poverty municipalities with many low-income affordable housing
program participants. Housing mobility programs help the poor move by housing
subsidies so affordable housing programs were selected for analysis. Also, only the
affordable housing programs which were located in wealthier municipalities can help
low-income families move to low-poverty municipalities and thus can be seen as housing
mobility programs. Considering that people’s economic status may change during the
time span of this research, the research tested the group differences in both the percentage
of the non-poor population change between 2000 and 2012 and the percentage of the total
population change between 2000 and 2012. MANCOVA can control other variables,
called covariates, which may affect moving decisions. By removing covariates’
extraneous variation in the dependent variables, MANCOVA can show the effect of group
differences on the two dependent variables. Tentative covariates included the percentage
of population with long travel time (longer than 30 minutes), the construction of new

7

housing units, the change of racial/ethnic composition, the change of crime rate, and
region. The bivariate correlation coefficients of each tentative covariate with the
dependent variables were tested to decide which covariates were included in the model.
This research is organized in the following way. Chapter II reviews the literature
regarding the Tiebout model, the consequences of applying the Tiebout model, federal
policies that exacerbated or intended to solve these consequences, and empirical studies
on housing mobility programs which were created to solve the consequences. This
chapter was concluded by framing the goals of this research based on the literature.
Chapter III creates a dynamic economic model as a new theoretical framework to
understand urban migration after housing mobility programs were adopted. Chapter IV
states the hypotheses of this research and presents the methods to test them. Chapter V
reports the results of statistical models. Chapter VI discusses the implications of the
findings and provides policy suggestions on supporting measures and recommendations
for future research.
.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter explains how political fragmentation can theoretically achieve spatial
equilibrium in the Tiebout model. Second, further economic models and empirical
evidence were reviewed to discuss the consequences of applying the Tiebout theory to the
real world. The third section describes main federal policies that strengthened or
attempted to weaken the effects of the Tiebout model—federal housing and transportation
policies and federal housing mobility programs. The final section explains why housing
mobility programs were trapped in Tiebout's voting mechanism and thus may not solve
the problem of poverty concentration and its related problems. This chapter ends with the
aim of the research— to create a dynamic economic model of urban migration to analyze
the long-term impact of housing mobility programs on sending municipalities, receiving
municipalities, and the people who live in one of those municipalities.

1. The Tiebout Model—Voting with One’s Feet
Since 1920s, states started to delegate the authority to regulate land use to local
governments (Dreier, et al., 2004:113). By 1968, zoning laws were enacted by 65 percent
of the 7,609 local governments in America (Dreier, et al., 2004: 113). Based on Tiebout’s
theory (1956), this political fragmentation can promote the efficiency of public good
provision because each local government has to be effective and efficient to attract people
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to live in its jurisdiction. The theory greatly influenced today’s service delivery
system—fragmentation. Since the dynamic economic model in this research is based on
the Tiebout model, Tiebout’s theory of the spatial equilibrium is briefly described.
There are seven assumptions in the Tiebout model. First, people are fully mobile and
will move to a community where the pattern of public goods provision accords with their
preference (Tiebout, 1956). Second, people have full knowledge about the revenue and
expenditure pattern in different communities (Tiebout, 1956). Third, there are a large
number of communities from which people can choose (Tiebout, 1956). Fourth, the
model does not consider the restrictions due to job opportunities (Tiebout, 1956). Fifth,
public services provision in one community has no positive or negative externalities on
other communities (Tiebout, 1956). Sixth, a city manager will follow the preference of
their current residents so there will be an optimal size of the community, which is defined
“in terms of the number of residents for which this bundle of services can be produced at
the lowest average cost” (Tiebout, 1956: 419). Seventh, communities below the optimal
population size will try to attract more residents to lower the average cost while those at
the optimal size will try to maintain the same population (Tiebout, 1956). On the other
hand, if communities are above the optimal size and thus generate congestion cost,
residents there will vote for other communities with their feet, which means relocating to
other communities (Tiebout, 1956).
Figure 1 shows how Tiebout’s theory works. Assume there are two jurisdictions and
each jurisdiction has 100 citizens (Brueckner, 2011: 167). Under head taxation, the cost
of per unit of public goods (C) is shared by everyone (C/100) (Brueckner, 2011: 167).
Assume people have different preferences. High-demand consumers, called the rich, have
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a demand curve denoted as Dr. Low-demand consumers, called the poor, have a demand
curve denoted as Dp. Despite heterogeneous composition of population in each
community, the socially optimal quantity of public goods can be achieved by people
voting with their feet. The quantity of public goods provided in jurisdiction I is Zp0
because of the poor majority while that in jurisdiction II is Zr0 because of the rich
majority. The rich in jurisdiction I will move to jurisdiction II to obtain extra public
goods they need while the poor in jurisdiction II will move to jurisdiction I to avoid
paying for public goods that exceeds their needs. Eventually, people with the same
preference for a bundle of tax and public goods will live in the same jurisdiction,
achieving the spatial equilibrium of public goods provision.

Figure 1 The Tiebout model
Source: Brueckner (2011: 167)

The difference between several terms in the Tiebout model needs to be clarified.
Shared cost is defined as the cost shared by each person in the same political jurisdiction
for each unit of public goods (see C/100 in figure 1). Although shared cost is paid in a
form of tax, the two terms—shared cost and tax—are different. Equation 1 shows the
relationship of the two terms. Tiebout (1956: 417) indicates that “a government’s
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objective is to figure out what public goods its consumers want and tax them accordingly.”
In figure 1, even though the shared cost is the same in the two jurisdictions, people in
different jurisdictions pay different amounts of tax, which is decided by the quantity of
public goods consumers in each jurisdiction want (see the shaded part in figure 1).
(People in the rich city demand more public goods (Zr0> Zp0) so they pay more tax than
the people in the poor city do.) Different people may have different preferences for the
bundle of tax and public goods. Eventually, each resident will live in a community where
the pattern of public goods and tax accords with their preference (Tiebout, 1956).
Considering that most researchers did not distinguish between the two terms and used
“tax” for their analysis, this research uses the same term, tax, when citing their work.
However, this research uses both terms for their specific meanings when creating the
economic model.
Tax= Shared cost * Quantity

(1)

2. Ineffectiveness of the Tiebout Model
Based on Tiebout’s theory (1956), public services can be better provided in a
decentralized system, like local governments, because this model requires multiple public
service providers for people to choose from. This section reviews theoretical models and
empirical evidence to examine whether the Tiebout model is effective or ineffective. This
section shows three unrealistic assumptions of the Tiebout model—the implicit
assumption of head taxation, the assumption of no externalities, and the assumption of
full mobility— and explains the consequences resulting from the violation of the three
assumptions.
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Neutral head taxation is the implicit assumptions in the Tiebout model to achieve the
efficiency of public good provision (Zodrow & Mieszkowski, 1986). However, property
taxation is more widely adopted by local governments in America (Konishi, 2008: 462).
Property taxation is redistributive taxation, meaning wealthier people have a higher tax
burden than poorer people do even though everyone in the same political jurisdiction
receives the same level of public services (Aronson & Schwartz, 1973). Since people
prefer to be subsidized by wealthier people rather than subsidize poorer people,
individuals tend to move to wealthier communities (Aronson & Schwartz, 1973).
Moreover, people usually do not consider the negative ripple effects of their migration on
other people’s tax burden when making residential decisions. Therefore, this externality
problem due to property taxation implies that Tiebout’s prediction about homogeneous
communities where people with the same preference live together may not happen. With
the heterogeneous preference of people, the optimal quantity of public goods may not
exist (Wildasin & Wilson, 1991: 321). Even if the optimal quantity does exist, the public
goods may not be efficiently distributed to different types of individuals (Wildasin &
Wilson, 1991: 321).
However, Hamilton (1975) indicated that the problems of public good provision due
to property taxation may not actually happen because local governments’ zoning policy
can segregate consumers by their preferences to prevent free-riding, thus eliminating the
distortions resulting from property taxation. By zoning out apartments and regulating
minimum lot sizes for single-family homes, local governments can prevent people who
cannot afford high-priced housing from moving in (Dreier, et al., 2004: 68). Empirical
evidence also showed a strong relationship between density zoning and income
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segregation (Rothwell & Massey, 2010). When density zoning excludes free riders and
makes communities homogeneous, property taxation is actually a form of head taxation
(Hamilton, 1975), thus achieving the equilibrium.
Since this equilibrium is not based on free-choice migration but on the migration
free from choice, this so-called equilibrium sometimes is called economic segregation or
poverty concentration. Although public choice theorists justifies that economic
segregation is simply a result of people with similar tastes for the bundle of tax and
public goods gathering together (Dreier, et al., 2004: 108), this research argues that the
homogeneous communities are actually the consequences resulting from two problematic
assumptions in the Tiebout model: full mobility and no externality. Since the in-migration
of the poor may have negative impacts on local public finance, each community tends to
take advantage of poor people’s weak economic mobility and adopt density zoning to
create a barrier to keep the poor out. Therefore, economic segregation, which accords
with Tiebout’s prediction, cannot verify the accuracy of the Tiebout model because
segregation is a distorted outcome resulting from the fact that the negative externality is
diminished by weakening poor people’s mobility.
Even though zoning policies made communities more homogeneous, the problem of
public good provision remained unsolved and more problems occurred in the
communities with poverty concentration. As Tiebout himself admitted, the higher the
costs of moving, the less likely to achieve optimal allocation of resources (Tiebout, 1956:
422). Therefore, as zoning increased poor people’s cost of moving, the public good
provision for the poor would be more away from equilibrium. Scholars noted that these
poverty-concentrated communities usually have fiscal problems and have to either
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increase tax rates or reduce the level of public services (Dreier, et al., 2004: 157). Either
decision motivates people to leave, further decreasing local governments’ financial
ability to provide public goods to their low-income citizens (Dreier, et al., 2004). Besides
inferior public goods, there are other negative effects of living in high-poverty
neighborhoods, such as disease, high crime rates, unemployment, and violence (W. J.
Wilson, 1997). In short, zoning keeps problems confined within some localities rather
than actually solves them.
Although zoning policies curb the in-migration of the poor, it cannot prevent the
out-migration of the middle class so the equilibrium of public good provision cannot be
achieved either in poverty-concentrated communities or in other communities. Tiebout’s
assumption that “[t]he public services supplied exhibit no external economies or
diseconomies between communities” (Tiebout, 1956: 419) seriously distorts reality. From
a political economy perspective, local governments tend to engage in tax competition or
public good competition to keep their current wealthy population and attract additional
ones from other jurisdictions (Bayindir-Upmann, 1998). However, scholars warned that
tax competition may lead to underprovision of local public goods2 (J. D. Wilson, 1986;
Zodrow & Mieszkowski, 1986) while public good competition may lead to overprovision
of local public goods 3 (Bayindir-Upmann, 1998). In sum, since zoning still cannot
eliminate the effect of externality, municipalities cannot achieve the equilibrium through
Tiebout’s market-analog mechanism.

2

The problem of underprovided local public goods occurs because local governments tend to choose
inefficiently low tax rates to attract capital investment and the low tax revenue further causes a low level of
public goods provision (J. D. Wilson, 1986; Zodrow & Mieszkowski, 1986).
3
Since a high level of public services can benefit industry, local governments which engage in public good
competition tend to overly provide public goods to mitigate capital flight or attract additional capital
(Bayindir-Upmann, 1998).
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Scholars provide different models to explain the motivation of local governments to
compete for business. For Peterson (1981), the competition is an economic problem:
Governments operate in an economic system which is dominated by private business so
local governments need to attract capital. For Kantor (1995: 2-3), cities depend on the tax
revenue from the jobs and dollars of business for public services, but they do not need
poor people to prosper. For Frug (1990), the competition is a legal problem: Since federal
and state laws control much of what cities can do, cities have limited legal tools4 to
control their economic destiny and thus tend to engage in the competition for capital to
maintain the urban economy. For Logan and Molotch (1987 [2002]: 469), the competition
is a cultural problem. Everyone in cities pursues economic growth so politicians take
actions to attract new investments and sustain old investments (Logan and Molotch, 1987
[2002]: 469). For C. N. Stone (1989 [2013]: 20-34), the competition is a political problem.
Cities are governed by those who control important concentrations of resources5 (C. N.
Stone (1989 [2013]: 20-34). Whatever local governments’ motivations are, these models
all showed local governments’ tendency to please wealthy individuals or institutions.
Therefore, the main problem of the Tiebout model is that Tiebout overlooked the
fact that not everyone is a target that local governments want to attract. In the context of
heterogeneous population, the difficulty of providing public goods to the poor is not
merely the shortage of tax revenue. Another obstacle is that even if local governments
have sufficient revenue, they may still not adopt the policies that benefit the poor because

4

For example, city governments have no rights to impose tax on non-residents who live in suburbs but
work in cities even though they use public services in cities every work days (Dreier, et al., 2004: 160).
5
Although some scholars think voting power means cities are governed by the public, Stone uses an
example in Atlanta to explain how high-resource groups, like business, employed the resources to protect
their privilege: Business used its resource to mobilize the unemployed workers, making city council agreed
to continue financial relief on business during the economic recession in 1930s (C. N. Stone, 1989 [2013]).
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they want to avoid becoming a welfare magnet (Kantor, 1995). Even worse, cities with
financial problems may adopt strategies that worsen poor people’s situation. Empirical
evidence found that even with limited resources, poorer cities provided businesses
indirect incentives, like tax abatements or reduced utility fees, which made the
high-income people pay less for some public goods than the low-income people do,
creating a more uneven situation (Rubin & Rubin, 1987). The local governments’
strategic behavior may cause underprovided merit goods6 like public health and welfare
(Ferreira, Varsano, & Afonso, 2005). Therefore, in the context of heterogeneous
population, the problem is not just underprovision or overprovision of local public goods.
The problem may also include wasteful duplication of public goods for high-income
people and scarcity of public goods for low-income people.
The above competition model is just one side of the story. Besides maximizing tax
revenue, politicians may also want to maximize the share of the voters who support them.
Glaeser and Shleifer (2005) built an economic model to demonstrate that political leaders
may adopt policies that encourage the out-migration of voters opposing them, thus
increasing the likelihood of their reelection. Therefore, instead of attracting wealthy
residents, it is possible that politicians repel the middle class for their personal
interests—reelection. Unfortunately, as the competition model predicted, helping
minorities, regardless of politicians’ intentions, may cause the stagnation of cities. For
example, Coleman Young, the first black mayor of Detroit in 1973, taxed his richer
constituents to fund redistribution and supported public housing (Glaeser & Shleifer,
2005:

12-13).

Although

he

adopted

these

policies

to

gain

his

political

advantage—reelection and served as the mayor of Detroit for 20 years (1974- 1994),
6

Merit goods are commodities provided on the basis of needs rather than the ability to pay.
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Detroit stagnated. Population declined by 32%, the percentage of households living
below the poverty line rose from 18.6% to 29.8%, and the unemployment rate was twice
as high when Young left office than when he first entered it (Glaeser & Shleifer, 2005).
David Dinkins, New York City’s first black mayor, also made a commitment to the poor
and homeless, causing a significant growth in homeless people (Kantor, 1995: 3-4). The
increase in the poor population limited the city’s financial capacity to support these
programs (Kantor, 1995: 4).
The above analysis indicates that the problem of public good provision for the poor
mainly resulted from two reasons. First, every policy involves redistribution (D. Stone,
2002 [2007]: 93). Each policy is funded by all citizens but may only benefit certain
groups of people. Second, political fragmentation implies that helping the poor is the
responsibility of the people who live in the same jurisdiction with the poor. The two
reasons explained why applying the Tiebout model may produce unfavorable attitudes of
local governments and wealthy people toward the poor. These attitudes give rise to
uneven provision of public goods for different economic classes. If local governments
help the poor, they cannot control the out-migration of the middle class and the
in-migration of the poor7, thus causing poverty concentration. Eventually, these local
governments may lack the financial capacity to provide public goods for their citizens. In
sum, the problem occurs because localities are either unwilling or unable to adopt
policies that benefit the poor.
7

People have to be the highest bidder to live in a certain location (Brueckner, 2011: 52). Density zoning
can only regulate the size of houses; it cannot regulate the price of the houses, which is decided by housing
markets. Therefore, even though the local governments still adopt zoning policies while helping the poor in
their jurisdictions, the zoning policy may not prevent the in-migration of the poor from other jurisdictions if
the middle class refuse to bid for living in that communities and decide to move to other jurisdictions,
making the poor the highest bidder in that communities. Under this circumstance, the in-migration of the
poor cannot be stopped by zoning.
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Like advocates of free markets believe that the welfare of the society can be
maximized if everyone adopts strategies that maximize his/her own benefit, Tiebout’s
market-analog mechanism suggests that the effectiveness of public good provision can be
achieved if every local government competes for potential consumers by effectively and
efficiently providing public goods. However, the prisoners’ dilemma describes a situation
that individuals’ best actions may lead to a disaster for the group (Dixit & Nalebuff, 2008
[2009]: 18). Similarly, the analysis in this section shows that the interlocal competition
may make local governments adopt policies that tend to privilege the high-income
individuals, disadvantage the low-income individuals, and therefore fail to achieve the
optimal bundle of tax and public goods.

3. Impacts of Federal Policies on the Tiebout Model
Markets are never free from government influences (Dreier, et al., 2004: 109) and
Tiebout’s market-analog mechanism is no exception. The analysis of a smaller unit
should include the impacts of its surrounding political systems (Ostrom, 1990 [2012]:
222). However, the Tiebout model failed to address the role of multiple levels of
governments (Baicker, Clemens, & Singhal, 2012: 1086). Most empirical research to test
Tiebout’s theory (Cebula & Nair-Reichert, 2012; Ellson, 1980; Grassmueck, 2011; Rhode
& Strumpf, 2003) only examined the variables at the local level, like tax and public
goods, on the sorting process and did not take federal policies during the time-span of
their data into consideration. Although some theoretical research described how federal
policies shaped people’s residential decisions and created the spatial pattern of the urban
poor and the suburban rich (Dreier, et al., 2004: 103-151), few economic models include
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the impact of federal policies on the Tiebout model. Most federal policies can affect local
governments more or less. This section only reviews the main federal policies that
influenced people’s residential decisions because these policies may exacerbate or
mitigate the negative consequences—the disadvantages of the poor— resulting from
Tiebout’s competition model.
The problems resulting from the Tiebout model made many scholars believe that
municipalities should be folded into bigger entities in order to efficiently and equally
provide public goods (Kirby, 2004: 754). However, it is the adequate policies, not the size
of the government, that solve urban problems (Siegel, 1999). In fact, misusing the power
of the “big box” government may even exacerbate rather than solve the problem8. This
research begins by reviewing how early federal policies worsened the unfavorable
situation of the poor and then describes what policies the federal government adopted to
correct its mistakes.

3.1 Federal policies that worsened the negative consequences
Federal transportation and housing policies strengthened the mobility of the middle
class, reinforcing the inequality between different economic classes. Federal
transportation policies benefited those who own a car instead of those who cannot afford
a car: the federal government spent 1.15 trillion on roads and highways but only 187
billion on mass transit between 1975 and 1995 (Dreier, et al., 2004: 117). The federal
government also set low fuel prices, imposed low taxes on cars, and subsidized parking

8

Savitch, Vogel, and Ye (2010) examined the outcomes of city-county consolidation of Louisville and
Jefferson County in Kentucky by comparing data from premerged and postmerged Louisville over a full
8-year period, they found that the economic development in the larger metropolis did not dramatically
change, even declined.
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costs (Williamson, Imbroscio, & Alperovitz, 2002: 77). As for federal housing subsidies,
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) provided mortgages to white middle-class
families in suburbs but little aid to black, urban residents, and renters (Dreier, et al., 2004:
121-122), increasing the wealth gap between the white and the black, between
house-owners and house-renters, and between central cities and suburbs.
Besides widening the gap of economic mobility between different economic classes,
federal transportation and housing policies, along with globalization (1980s
forward), caused the problem of spatial mismatch and thus blocked poor people’s upward
economic mobility. FHA provided more mortgages to those who purchased a house in
suburbs than those who purchased a house in cities, which encouraged the middle class to
live in suburbs (Dreier, et al., 2004: 121-122). Federal transportation subsidies
strengthened this trend by reducing commuting costs of living in suburbs. The spatial
pattern of the urban poor and the suburban rich had been gradually formed since these
federal policies were adopted in the 1930s9. Later, the development of information
technologies in the age of globalization allowed those industries that benefit less from
agglomeration economies, like manufacturing, retail, and other low-skilled jobs, to
relocate to the suburbs (Wyly, Glickman, & Lahr, 1998: 9) while those highly-skilled
professional jobs which rely on urban density to spread knowledge or to
stimulate innovation remained in cities (Dreier, et al., 2004: 67). This spatial distribution
of high/low-skilled jobs, along with the spatial pattern of the urban poor and the suburban

9

As to housing subsidies, Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) was created in 1933 by Congress to
provide low-interest loan to owners (Dreier, et al., 2004: 120). Later, FHA and Veterans Administration (VA)
were established to promote home ownership (Dreier, et al., 2004: 120). As to transportation subsidies, in
1934, states were required to receive federal highway funds to build roads (Dreier, et al., 2004: 115). Later,
the fund expenditure increased dramatically: $79 million in 1946, $429 million in1950, $2.9 billion in 1960,
and $20.5 billion in 1997 (Dreier, et al., 2004: 116).
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rich (high/low-skilled workers), created spatial mismatch. Although this problem was
partly attributed to the global economic restructuring, the comparison between the spatial
polarization in America and that in other developed countries revealed that political
institutions and policies were the main cause of this pattern rather than economic forces
(Dreier, et al., 2004: 61).
Spatial mismatch was especially harmful to the urban poor, although it harmed both
economic classes. The middle class suffered less because of their economic ability to
afford commuting costs and because of federal subsidies on highway construction,
gasoline, parking and other car-related costs. On the contrary, those who could not afford
an automobile to access the labor market in suburbs received few federal subsidies on
public transit service (W. J. Wilson, 1997: 42; 2009: 10). This spatial inaccessibility of
jobs further made the urban poor suffer from joblessness (W. J. Wilson, 1997). Even if
the poor managed to work in suburbs, evidence showed that people who left welfare for
work tended to be poorer in the next year because the low wage could not cover the cost
of transportation, health insurance, baby-sitting, and other costs (W. J. Wilson, 1997:
79-80). In short, poor people’s upward economic mobility was limited, and so was their
ability to vote with their feet. Their situation implies that federal policies indirectly
weakened the economic mobility of the poor.
In sum, these federal housing and transportation policies exacerbated the negative
outcomes of Tiebout’s competition model. Instead of providing sufficient resources and
channels to help the poor to improve their economic mobility, the federal government
weakened their economic mobility, thus prohibiting them from leaving their residences
(usually in inner cities). On the other hand, the federal policies strengthened the
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economic mobility of the middle class by subsidizing them to move to other jurisdictions
more easily, therefore intensifying the competition between local governments. The
intense competition implied that local governments may need to provide more tax
incentives or a higher level of public goods to keep the middle class or to attract new
ones. In sum, the federal government exacerbated the problem of inequality between
different economic classes and the disadvantages of the poor by increasing the economic
gap and intensifying interlocal competition.

3.2 Federal policies that attempted to mitigate the negative consequences
Concerns over urban poverty and its related social problems10 grew throughout the
1980s, leading to anti-poverty policies in early 1990s (Imbroscio, 2004b: 447). Among all
policy alternatives, many American urban scholars believed that the dispersal of
low-income families to wealthier neighborhoods is the best solution to fight poverty
(Imbroscio, 2008). This mobility approach was based on the belief that residential
mobility can improve economic mobility. That is, once the poor are relocated to the
neighborhoods with greater resources and opportunities, they can escape from constant
poverty. This section reviewed current findings to show whether housing mobility
programs were effective or not.
Section 3.2.1 explains the definition of housing mobility programs in this research.
Not all programs which provide housing subsidies are defined as housing mobility
programs in this research. Section 3.2.2, program theories of housing mobility programs,
outlines the theoretical mechanisms how residential mobility can improve economic
10

When people cannot obtain their daily necessities through conventional channels, namely jobs, people
turned to crime (Dreier, et al., 2004: 93). In fact, central-city crime rates were three times suburban crime
rates in 1990s (Dreier, et al., 2004: 92).

23

mobility. Section 3.2.3 examined if housing mobility programs could activate each
mechanism and if program participants’ economic mobility improved.

3.2.1 Definition of housing mobility programs
Housing mobility programs were created to help low-income families move to
low-poverty neighborhoods by subsidizing housing rent. The affordable rents allowed
program participants to move to where they otherwise cannot afford. However,
considerable research indicated that many programs failed to help program participants
relocate, or even if they did, participants moved to vulnerable neighborhoods (Crump,
2003; DeLuca, Garboden, & Rosenblatt, 2013; Edin, DeLuca, & Owens, 2012; Finkel &
Buron, 2001; Goering, Feins, & Richardson, 2003: 14; Goetz & Chapple, 2010;
Imbroscio, 2012). Although many researchers have analyzed the effectiveness of housing
mobility programs by examining participants’ individual outcomes, this research argues
that the programs that failed to relocate participants to low-poverty neighborhoods would
be a weak test of mobility-based solution: The outcomes can only show whether or not
that specific program was effective and cannot answer whether or not the approach of
relocating the poor to better neighborhoods were effective.
Since the key assumption of housing mobility programs is the benefits associated
with wealthier neighbors (Briggs, 1997: 195; Pattillo, 2008: 36), only those cases which
actually received rental assistance and successfully relocated to low-poverty localities
were identified as housing mobility programs. Thus, this research defined housing
mobility programs in cases rather than in programs. Project-based housing assistance
needs to be located in a low-poverty locality to be considered as housing mobility
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programs. Those located in high-poverty localities are not housing mobility programs
because the assistance only helps low-income families move to other high-poverty
localities. As to tenant-based housing assistance, only when program participants use
rental assistance to move to a low-poverty locality, the assistance is considered as a
housing mobility program. For example, among the participants of Moving to
Opportunity (MTO 11 ) program, only those who successfully moved to low-poverty
neighborhoods are considered as the participants of housing mobility programs.
This research focuses only on the policies that move the poor from high-poverty
neighborhoods to low-poverty neighborhoods, so the disturbance from gentrification
programs, like Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE VI) programs, was
removed. Housing mobility programs emphasized on helping the poor move in to
low-poverty receiving neighborhoods while gentrification programs forced the poor to
move out of sending neighborhoods and emphasized the reconstruction of sending
neighborhoods. This research concerns the impacts of housing mobility programs on
receiving localities and on individual outcomes of the low-income families who moved in
these receiving localities. These impacts cannot be observed if gentrification programs
forced low-income families to leave these receiving places. Therefore, this research
excludes the localities which experienced gentrification programs after housing mobility
programs were adopted.

3.2.2 Program theories of housing mobility programs
Housing mobility programs, which improved residential mobility, were expected to
11

MTO, operated from 1994 to 1998, aimed to “assist very low income families with children……to move
out of areas with high concentrations of persons living in poverty to areas with low concentrations of such
persons” (Section 152 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992).
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improve economic mobility through the following mechanisms. First, the theory of spatial
mismatch and empirical finding indicated that poverty was positively related to the lack
of physical accessibility to economic opportunities (Holzer, 1991). Since housing
mobility programs could bridge the gap between low-skilled workers and low-skilled
jobs in suburbs, housing mobility programs were considered the best solution to fight
poverty by many urban scholars (Imbroscio, 2004b, 2006).
Second, housing mobility programs could create mixed-income neighborhoods,
which help expand low-income persons’ job network. Wilson’s theory (1987, 1996) of
social isolation indicated that people in extreme poverty neighborhoods usually had
limited resources, opportunities, and channels to find a job, causing joblessness after the
selective out-migration of the middle class. Based on Wilson’s theory, Kasintiz and
Rosenberg (1996) analyzed the connection between social isolation and employment in
the Red Hook section of Brooklyn, New York, and found that the poor, although they
lived close to blue-collar jobs, remained unemployed because most jobs there were filled
through social networks and the poor did not have the connection and references. By
creating mixed-income neighborhoods, housing mobility programs may help program
participants establish social networks with employed middle-class neighbors, who can
provide information about jobs and more useful referrals, thus increasing the poor’s
chance of finding a job (Kleit, 2002; W. J. Wilson, 1996).
Creating mixed-income neighborhoods by housing mobility programs was also
based on peer influence on shaping individual’s behavior (Ellen & Turner, 2003: 327).
Wilson’s social isolation theory (1987, 1996) indicated that high-poverty neighborhoods
lacked positive role models, so the environment may shape people’s social behavior
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which was unfavorable in job markets. Advocates believed that housing mobility
programs can improve the poor’s economic mobility by breaking the isolation and
depending on the presence of middle-class role models to influence the social choices of
low-income individuals (Chaskin & Joseph, 2013; DeFilippis & Fraser, 2010: 137).
Third, housing mobility programs could improve low-income persons’ access to
better and more public goods and services because these goods are collective
consumptions and are better provided in wealthy neighborhoods than in poor ones
(DeFilippis & Fraser, 2010: 137). With residential segregation, unequal access to public
goods like schools, healthy environment, safety, and medical services can shape or
constrain people’s upward opportunity (Dreier, et al., 2004: 28). For example, besides
spatial mismatch, skills mismatch is another explanation for unemployment (Bauder &
Perle, 1999). People in high-poverty localities tended to have poor education resources,
like unqualified teachers, improper equipment and books (W. J. Wilson, 1997: 9-10). The
inferior education resources limited people’s skills and thus limited their opportunities for
high-paid jobs. Since schools in low-poverty neighborhoods had more resources, more
stable academic environments, and lower pupil-teacher ratio, housing mobility programs
were expected to increase children’s skills and thus enhance their life opportunities (Orr
et al., 2003: 109; Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011: 220). Also, since mental and physical health
affects job performances, resources to improve individuals’ mental and physical health,
like healthcare access, park, neighborhood walkability, lower pollution, and better
sanitation, may also be a positive factor to improve employment outcomes.
The above theories revealed that housing mobility programs emphasize exposing
low-income individuals to higher socioeconomic status peers (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2012:
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112, 114) and heavily rely on the middle class to bring positive changes to low-income
individuals (Pattillo, 2008: 36). In fact, some scholars even criticized that housing
mobility programs overemphasize the importance of the middle class, indicating the
inappropriate assumption that the middle class can be role models while the poor tend to
have problematic behavior, which needs to be modified or controlled (Pattillo, 2008: 38).
This dissertation sets the topic in an economic context and does not intend to argue for or
against theories related to social network or middle-class role models. From an economic
view, however, wealthy people do have positive influence on the poor because of
property taxation. Many poverty-concentrated cities struggle to provide adequate public
goods for citizens due to the limited tax revenue from their low-income residents and the
lack of power to tax the rich free-riders in suburbs, who work in cities and use the urban
public services paid by the urban poor (Dreier, et al., 2004: 156-157). Without providing
financial aid or public goods to receiving localities, housing mobility programs actually
relied on wealthier residents to share public goods and services with their new
low-income neighbors. Property taxation allows the poor to pay relatively less than the
others do while enjoying the same level of public goods.

3.2.3 Outcomes of housing mobility programs
The discussion of outcomes focuses on the impacts of housing mobility programs on
economic mobility because enhancing economic mobility was not only the main goal of
providing the poor residential mobility but also related to whether or not housing
mobility programs could weaken the effects of property taxation and externalities. This
section reviews the impact of housing mobility programs on each mechanism— the
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accessibility to work, social network, behavior, and the availability of public goods— and
then discusses if the economic mobility of participants was enhanced.
One of the main difficulties to evaluate the effect of housing mobility programs on
economic mobility comes from the self-selection problem, which means individual or
household attributes may affect participants’ decisions on not moving, moving to
low-poverty neighborhoods, or moving to other high-poverty neighborhoods (Shroder &
Orr, 2012). Most housing mobility programs allowed program participants to decide
where to live, and their decisions may influence outcomes. Thus, scholars were unable to
distinguish whether the change of economic mobility was related to participants’
attributes or other neighborhood contextual variables (Ludwig, Duncan, & Pinkston,
2000: 4).
Since MTO was expected to overcome the self-selection bias due to its nature of
social experimental design, this research mainly reviewed the outcomes of MTO. MTO
participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups: the experimental group was
given housing vouchers that could only be used in low-poverty (below 10 percent)
neighborhoods; the comparison group was given housing vouchers with no geographical
restriction; and the control group was not given housing vouchers. Since residential
decisions in MTO were made by random assignments rather than individual choices,
MTO was expected to overcome the self-selection bias.
Ideally, if all participants complied with the MTO program requirements, scholars
can isolate the neighborhoods effects from individual or family attributes by the
comparison between the experimental group and the control group. However, less than
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half of MTO experimental group participants (47%) moved with their vouchers

12

.

Therefore, there are two types of group-based analysis. The intent-to-treat (ITT) effect is
measured by the comparison between the average outcome of the full experimental group
and that of the control group while the treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) effect is between
the experimental movers, who actually relocated with MTO vouchers, and the control
group (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011: XIII). The following used both the ITT and TOT effects
to discuss the findings of MTO.

A. Impact on accessibility to work
MTO alone could not improve the accessibility to work unless public transportation
was near receiving neighborhoods. Although the experimental group was given vouchers
to move to low-poverty neighborhoods, both the ITT and TOT effects showed no
significant difference across groups when people were asked if they have a working car
or live less than 15 minutes to public transportation (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011: 62). Since
MTO did not improve participants’ access to jobs, MTO’s disappointing employment
outcomes cannot be seen as evidence that spatial mismatch was not the cause of poverty
(Quigley & Raphael, 2008). In fact, Blumenberg and Pierce (2014) found that MTO
movers who gained access to a car or public transit were positively related to
employment outcomes after controlling the effect of demographic and socioeconomic
characteristics, housing attributes, and neighborhood quality.

B. Impact on social network
Research showed mixed evidence of the effect of social networks on employment.
12

The data comes from exhibit 2.5 in Orr and others (2003).

30

Ellen and Turner (2003) examined existing empirical evidence and concluded that
qualitative research tended to show the importance of social networks on employment,
like people learning job opportunities by “word-of-mouth,” while quantitative research
tended to show weak relationships between social networks and employment.
Whether social networks had effect on employment or not, MTO alone had few
effects on expanding participants’ social networks with the middle class. Both the ITT
and TOT effects showed that neighborhoods of the experimental group significantly had
more share of college graduates, more share of employed civilians, and more share of
workers in managerial or professional occupation (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011: 60-61).
However, participants encountered difficulties to build meaningful relationships with
wealthier neighbors (Varady & Walker, 2003: 20). Instead of socioeconomic mix, Curley
(2010) indicated that the key predictor of social network is the neighborhood resources,
like libraries, recreation facilities, parks, grocery stores, and social services, which
provide opportunities for direct interaction between neighbors. In sum, creating
mixed-income neighborhoods without these public facilities may not improve
participants’ social networks with their middle-income neighbors.

C. Impact on behavior
Interim impacts evaluation (4-7 years after random assignment) showed that both
children and adolescents were less likely to commit crimes or be exposed to crimes after
moving with MTO vouchers (Hanratty, McLanahan, & Pettit, 2003; Katz, Kling, &
Liebman, 2000, 2003; Ludwig, Duncan, & Hirschfield, 2001; Ludwig, Duncan, & Ladd,
2003; Orr et al., 2003). People without criminal records are more employable than those
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with criminal records. Thus, scholars expected MTO to have positive long-term effects on
economic self-sufficiency (Wasserman, 2001: 31).
However, the final impacts evaluation (10-15 years after random assignment)
indicated that both ITT and TOT effects for grown children ages 21–30 and adults
showed no significant group difference in criminal behavior (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011:
202-205). What is worse, both ITT and TOT effects showed that the youth ages 15-20
(those who had been living in low-poverty neighborhoods early in their childhoods) in
experimental group had higher property crime arrest rates than those in the control group
(Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011: 200).

D. Impact on public goods
Although the experimental group children attended schools with greater resources,
fewer limited English proficient students, and higher ranks on state exams than did the
control group children, no significant ITT or TOT effects on educational outcomes was
found (Ladd & Ludwig, 2003; Newman & Harkness, 2003; Orr et al., 2003: 109-110,
116-121; Sanbonmatsu, Kling, Duncan, & Brooks-Gunn, 2006). Indicators of educational
outcomes included reading, math, word identification, passage comprehension, applied
problems, calculation, concept formation, grades received, advanced coursework, ever
repeated a grade, and SAT/ACT (Orr et al., 2003: 109-110). The final evaluation (10-15
years after assignment) also drew a similar conclusion that MTO had few detectable
impacts on educational outcomes for youth (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011: 230-238).
Due to the improvement in public sanitation and public safety, the experimental
group adults experienced fewer physical and mental health problems than did the control
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group adults, but the positive effects were weaker in the long term. Compared with the
control group, the experimental group reported fewer problems with vermin, felt safer in
their current neighborhoods, and had higher likelihood of police response to 911
emergency calls in both the interim impacts and final impacts evaluation (Orr et al., 2003:
74-75; Rosenbaum & Harris, 2001; Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011: 102-103). The interim
evaluation (both ITT and TOT effects) showed that the experimental group adults had
significantly better health than did the control group adults, including reducing extreme
obesity (BMI ≥ 35 kg/m2), less psychological distress or depression, and higher
likelihood of being calm and peaceful (Orr et al., 2003: 77). In the final evaluation,
although the ITT and TOT effects showed that the experimental group adults is less likely
to have serious illness like diabetes, high blood sugar, and serious stomach problem than
the control group adults, there was no longer a statistically significant impact on adults’
mental health (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011: 102-103, 133-135).

E. Impact on economic mobility
The above analysis suggested that MTO may not effectively activate the
mechanisms that were expected to improve employment outcomes. MTO could improve
accessibility to work only when receiving neighborhoods were close to public transit.
MTO could expand participants’ social network with the middle class only when
receiving neighborhoods had public goods that provided a space for neighbors to interact
with each other. Although interim impacts evaluation showed that MTO may have
reduced participants’ tendency to commit crimes, this tendency was no longer statistically
significant in a longer term. Better schools had limited effect on the educational outcomes
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of the MTO youths. The public sanitation and public safety in receiving neighborhoods
may improve MTO adults’ physical and mental health at first, but no significant
difference across groups in mental health was found in a longer term.
Therefore, it is not surprising that few studies found significant impacts of MTO on
participants’ economic self-sufficiency. Researchers used different variables to measure
the ITT and TOT effects on economic self-sufficiency. Early-impact analysis
suggested no significant group difference in the changes of employment, earnings, and
welfare participation from baseline to follow-up (Hanratty, McLanahan, & Pettit, 2003;
Katz, Kling, & Liebman, 2000, 2003; Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn, 2003). Considering that
MTO had obvious positive impacts on neighborhood resources, decreased criminal
behavior, increased health, and possible children’s educational achievement, scholars
believed that the improvement of economic self-sufficiency had just not yet happened.
However, the results from recent follow-up evaluation (10-15 years after assignment) still
did not show significant improvement in MTO adults’ employment, earnings, or welfare
participation (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2012: XXVII). This final impact evaluation also
showed that MTO did not improve children’s life opportunities: There were no group
difference (both ITT and TOT estimates) on school enrollment, idleness, and weekly
earning for MTO youth ages 15–20 (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2012: 157). Even worse, the
experimental group youth were significantly less likely to be employed than the control
group youth (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2012: 157).
However, ClampetLundquist and Massey (2008) argued that the mechanisms to
improve economic self-sufficiency required time to take effect but the previous findings
from group-based analysis overlooked the possibility of subsequent residential changes.
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In other words, the TOT effects still could not show the effectiveness of housing mobility
programs because even if the experimental group families moved with their housing
vouchers, they were not required to stay in low-poverty neighborhoods after one year
when the lease expired (ClampetLundquist and Massey, 2008: 121). To overcome this
deficiency of group-based analysis, ClampetLundquist and Massey (2008) used
individual movers as an analysis unit and measured duration, namely months MTO
movers stay in non-poor neighborhoods (below 20 percent), as an independent variable,
and found a strong positive relationship between the duration and the odds of being
employed. Moreover, if the low-poverty neighborhoods were racially integrated, the
duration was positively related to weekly earnings (ClampetLundquist and Massey,
2008).
Generally speaking, scholars have two opposite interpretations regarding the
outcomes of no significant difference across groups and positive outcomes from
mover-based analysis. One group of scholars believes that the potential of housing
mobility programs was limited because the federal government failed to “provide
voucher holders access to high opportunity areas” (Sard, 2008: 1). Based on this logic, if
all MTO participants complied with the program requirements and kept staying in the
receiving neighborhoods, economic outcomes should be significantly different across
groups. Therefore, instead of questioning housing mobility programs for the
disappointing outcomes, this group of scholars analyzed factors that restricted or fostered
mobility or factors that prevented low-income families from staying in receiving
neighborhoods in order to provide policy suggestions for greater mobility (e.g., DeLuca,
Garboden, & Rosenblatt, 2013; Edin, DeLuca, & Owens, 2012; Shroder, 2003).
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Based on the disappointing outcomes from group-based analysis, another group of
scholars questioned the effectiveness of housing mobility programs and revealed the
limitations of housing mobility programs. Since the number of neighborhoods with good
public services and job opportunities has been decreasing, housing mobility programs
lack enough good areas to accommodate all low-income families (Booza, Cutsinger, &
Galster, 2006). It is inevitable that many poor people would be left behind in the
high-poverty neighborhoods. Moreover, although concentrated poverty had been
dramatically declined in the 1990s (Jargowsky, 2003), Galster’s model (2005a) showed
that this new distribution of poor population may reduce the overall well-being of a
metropolitan area because the poor comers may push the threshold of the poverty rate in
receiving localities which started to cause negative external effects on their neighboring
localities. Based on this finding, Galster (2005b) reminded urban scholars to consider the
impact of housing mobility programs on the well-being of other members of society
besides the poor.
This research argues that policy supporters may commit reductionist fallacy13 while
policy opponents may commit ecological fallacy14. Although the assignment to the three
groups was random, participants still could decide whether or not to use their housing
vouchers and whether or not to stay in receiving neighborhoods once their leases expired.
Therefore, the positive impacts on the movers with long duration of living in low-poverty
neighborhoods may not solely result from neighborhood effects but also from their

13

Reductionist fallacy is defined as “an error in reasoning that occurs when incorrect conclusions about
group-level processes are based on individual-level data” (Schutt, 2012: 174).
14
Ecological fallacy is defined as “an error in reasoning in which incorrect conclusions about
individual-level processes are drawn from group-level data” (Schutt, 2012: 174).
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similar individual attributes15. Thus, it is not appropriate for housing mobility programs
supporters to use the individual-level (mover-based) finding to assume that housing
mobility programs would work on any kinds of low-income families as long as the
federal government sends them to low-poverty neighborhoods and helps them stay there
for a longer period of time. On the other hand, it is also inappropriate for housing
mobility programs opponents to use the disappointing group-based findings to claim that
housing mobility programs had little effect on improving economic outcomes of all types
of movers. What can be concluded so far is that housing mobility programs improved the
employment outcomes of the low-income families who were willing to move,
successfully moved to, and stayed in low-poverty neighborhoods for longer time.
However, it is still unclear if this positive impact will remain in the long run.
The impacts of housing mobility programs on receiving neighborhoods may also
affect employment outcomes. Research on the impacts of subsidized housing on
receiving localities (for a summary, see Galster, Tatian, Santiago, Pettit, & Smith, 2003:
74-86) implied that neighborhoods that initially met the criteria of resources,
opportunities, and wealthy neighbors may change after the poor moved in. Once
receiving neighborhoods fail to meet those criteria, they may not bring positive influence
on low-income movers.
Unfortunately, the impacts of housing mobility programs on receiving localities are
still indecisive for two reasons. First, most research did not have convincing argument
about the direction of the causation between assisted housing and the conditions of
receiving localities (Galster et al., 2003: 83). For example, it is unclear whether the low

15

Shroder (2003) found that some household characteristics of MTO movers are significantly related to
successful lease-up.
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property values or high crime rates in receiving localities was because assisted housing
caused the decline or because assisted housing tended to be located in the declining
neighborhoods with low property value and quality of life (Galster et al., 2003: 83-84).
This spatial pattern of assisted housing is possible because affluent jurisdictions may
adopt zoning regulations to limit rental housing, developers may build affordable housing
on cheaper land which is more likely to be in weak housing markets, and landowners may
be more willing to agree on the construction of assisted housing if their land cannot be
used for higher-value activities (Galster et al., 2003: 84; Turner, Popkin, & Cunningham,
2000). This research could avoid this selection of bias because only assisted housing
located in low-poverty localities is considered as housing mobility programs (see section
3.2.1 in this chapter). Assisted housing in weak markets like high-poverty neighborhoods
is not considered as housing mobility programs in this research.
Second, the selection of impact range may affect research findings. Different
research used different range to measure the impact of housing mobility programs on
receiving localities, such as census tracts or circular areas with a different radius. Most
research did not provide a theoretical basis to justify their selection or explain why the
impact will happen in the selected range. Since different findings may be related to their
selection of impact range, this research can only conclude that housing mobility programs
may change the conditions of receiving localities but whether the change is positive or
negative remained uncertain.

4. Aim of the Research
This research aims to analyze the impact of housing mobility programs on the
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migration of different economic classes in both high-poverty sending municipalities and
low-poverty receiving municipalities. Since housing mobility programs highly depend on
mixed-income environment, the analysis on housing mobility programs’ impacts on
further migration can reveal whether or not the created mixed-income environment will
last in a longer term, thus helping explain the effectiveness of housing mobility programs.
A dynamic economic model of urban migration was created to analyze the migration of
different economic classes after housing mobility programs were adopted. Statistical
models focused on the migration of wealthier residents in low-poverty receiving
municipalities to test if data support the economic model.
This research is based on the Tiebout model because housing mobility programs did
not change the nature of political fragmentation by adopting supporting measures in
receiving localities and because most housing mobility programs’ mechanisms require
input of adequate public goods to operate. Housing mobility programs need public goods
such as public transit, public spaces for social interaction, and educational and health
facilities to activate the mechanisms that were expected to improve individual economic
outcomes. However, without support from the federal government, the cost of extra
public goods due to the increased poor population was mostly shared by non-poor
population in receiving municipalities because the tax from these new poor comers may
be minimal. This changed bundle of taxes and public good levels may influence the
residential decisions of the non-poor persons in receiving municipalities, especially the
middle class with economic mobility to move. This argument of voting mechanism
provides a clear direction of causation to explain the decline of receiving localities after
housing mobility programs were adopted. By analyzing how housing mobility programs
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affect the bundle of taxes and public goods in both sending and receiving municipalities
and how these impacts influence people voting with their feet, this research includes the
impact of housing mobility programs on receiving municipalities to predict the long-term
impact of housing mobility programs on individual outcomes.
Based on the Tiebout model, “municipality”, the smallest geographical unit with the
power to decide its own tax rate and public goods, would be a reasonable impact range of
housing mobility programs on receiving localities. Therefore, municipality, defined as a
type of governmental unit incorporated under state law and having legally prescribed
powers and functions16, is the analysis unit in this research.
The Tiebout model cannot be directly used for analysis due to its three unrealistic
assumptions—the implicit assumption of head taxation, full mobility, and no externalities,
so this research needs to remove these assumptions and creates a new model to analyze
the migration of different economic classes. The economic model in this research uses
widely-adopted property taxation for analysis. To reflect externalities, people are allowed
to make residential decisions every time other people move in or out. As to the
assumption of full mobility, this research assumes that housing mobility programs
improve the residential mobility of the poor. This assumption helps predict possible
outcomes if the federal government promotes greater degree of mobility.
Also, this new economic model needs to be dynamic because each migration may
become a driver of further migration. This research analyzes moving decisions of the
residents in both receiving and sending municipalities in order to show the dynamic
process of urban migration and the spatial distribution of different economic classes at

16

According to this definition, municipalities in this research simply mean a type of governmental unit. It
is possible that they are located in either central cities or suburbs.
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the end of the dynamic. This dynamic can reveal the long-term impacts of housing
mobility programs on urban migration, which may affect the individual outcomes of
program participants.
This research does not intend to isolate neighborhood effects from selection bias.
Previous research indicated that individual outcomes may be related to individual
variables. This research does not intend to generalize the impact of housing mobility
programs on all types of low-income families. Instead, the research only focuses on the
movers who experienced positive employment outcomes found by ClampetLundquist
and Massey (2008). Although this research does not directly measure individual
outcomes, the findings of the research can indirectly predict possible long-term effects of
housing mobility programs on participants by showing whether receiving municipalities
will remain mixed-income or suffer from poverty concentration in the long term.
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CHAPTER III
DYNAMIC ECONOMIC MODEL OF URBAN MIGRATION

This chapter creates a dynamic economic model to explain the urban migration after
housing mobility programs were adopted. The model provides a theoretical perspective
different from the Tiebout model and other economic models described in Chapter II.
Most economic models of mobility, like the Tiebout model, were based on utility
maximization, which means people make residential choices to maximize their
well-being (Ellen, 2000: 105). Tiebout’s framework involves both moving out of the
jurisdictions with lower utility and moving to the jurisdictions with higher utility. Since
this research focuses on people’s move-out decisions, the dynamic economic model
borrowed the concept of “dissatisfaction” from literature of sociology because this
sociological concept is often used to explain out-migration. Unlike an economic
theoretical framework, the sociological concept of “dissatisfaction” indicates that people
consider moving only when they are unsatisfied with their current location (Ellen, 2000:
105). In other words, satisfied households have no motivation to move to another location
even if they know they would be better off in other jurisdictions (Ellen, 2000: 105).
Satisfied households do not spend time, energy, and cost on gathering information of
other municipalities, let alone plan on moving based on the information they don’t bother
obtaining. Therefore, instead of comparing the utility of different municipalities, this
dynamic economic model compares people’s economic surplus in the same municipality
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before and after some people move in or out to analyze whether or not people have
motivation to move. This dynamic model is less affected by the incomplete information
problem because it only requires households to assess their situation based on the
information they already have. This chapter includes the assumptions and theory
construction of the dynamic model.

1. Assumptions
The economic model of urban migration includes the following assumptions. First,
housing mobility programs increase the likelihood that the poor can move to wealthier
municipalities. The strategy of solving poverty via geographic opportunity has been
popular since the 1990s (Imbroscio, 2004b: 447). Many urban scholars still support this
strategy and promote greater mobility (see Edin et al., 2012; Turner, Popkin, & Rawlings,
2009). Moreover, the federal government historically and currently funds assisted
housing to improve the residential mobility of low-income families. Therefore, this
research assumes housing mobility programs increase the possibility that poor families
with the intention to move to low-poverty municipalities may do so.
Second, this research assumes that the role of local governments is neutral, which
means local governments follow preferences of their current residents. Although the
competition model indicated that local governments may only adopt policies to attract
capital or high-income persons, Glaeser and Shleifer’s model (2005) showed that it is
possible for political leaders of a municipality with a high percentage of poor population
to adopt policies that benefit the poor in order to win reelection.
Third, this research assumes there are two economic classes—the poor and the
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non-poor. The gap between different economic classes only decides the degree of the
effect of property taxation. As long as the economic gap exists, property taxation has an
effect after housing mobility programs break economic segregation. Therefore, including
only two economic classes is sufficient to analyze the effect of housing mobility
programs on local taxes and public goods under property taxation (Including more
economic classes in the dynamic model only makes the model more complicated but does
not change the results deduced from the model).
Fourth, this research assumes that persons with higher income (the non-poor)
demand more public goods than persons with lower income (the poor) do. Based on the
positive relationship between housing prices and the level of public goods17, this research
assumes that persons who can afford to purchase houses tend to require more public
goods to maximize their property values than the poor do.
Fifth, this research assumes the quantity of public goods is fixed in a short term
because local governments do not demolish the built public goods for a decreasing
population and are unable to increase the quantity of public goods for an increasing
population in the short term because the construction of public goods takes time. Public
goods can be built for the increased population only in a long term.
Sixth, this research assumes that the tax paid by the people who do not move is fixed
in a short term. Tax is the product of tax base and tax rate. This assumption is based on
that fact that the change of population in a municipality does not change people’s tax base
in the short run and local governments are also unlikely to quickly adjust tax rate for the
changed population in the short term. For example, it would be impractical for a local

17

The positive impact of public goods on housing price is called capitalization effect of public goods
(Brueckner, 2011: 179).
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government to increase a tax rate from 6% to 6.0001% for a shrinking population or to
decrease a tax rate from 6% to 5.9999% for a growing population. Therefore, this
research assumes that the poor who stay in sending municipalities and the non-poor who
stay in receiving municipalities pay the same amount of tax before and after housing
mobility programs were adopted.
Seventh, this research assumes receiving municipalities may have excess capacity of
public goods. Public good competition between localities tend to make local governments
over-provide local public goods (Bayindir-Upmann, 1998). Thus, the research assumes
municipalities, especially wealthier municipalities, tend to have excess capacity of public
goods.
Eighth, this research assumes that there is no transaction cost for information about
the budget of a local government. People are assumed to have full knowledge of the
change of their economic surplus before and after any migration. Since households are
required to know only the information about the municipality where they live, the
research assumes that people can obtain that information without transaction costs.

2. Theory Construction
Since housing mobility programs were designed to solve poverty by breaking the
segregation of different economic classes, the dynamic model of urban migration starts
with two homogeneous municipalities—one poor municipality and one rich municipality.
The model then analyzes the impact of the poor’s out-migration on the poor sending
municipality and the impact of the poor’s in-migration on the rich receiving municipality.
The last section explains the dynamic migration based on the above two impacts and
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reveals three possible long-term consequences after the whole dynamic. A list of algebras
used in the dynamic economic model can be found in appendix 1.

2.1 Two homogeneous municipalities
Figure 2 represents two homogeneous municipalities (economic segregation) before
housing mobility programs were adopted. The horizontal and vertical axes have the same
meaning as that in the Tiebout model: shared cost (SC) and quantity of public goods (Z).
Dp is the demand curve of the poor while Dr is the demand curve of the non-poor. In a
homogeneous municipality, property taxation is similar to head taxation because every
resident in the municipality is equally wealth or equally poor. Thus, the shared cost in the
poor sending municipality, denoted by Cp0, is calculated by dividing the price of a unit of
public good P by the population of the sending municipality Np0 (see equation 2) while
the shared cost in the rich receiving municipality, denoted by Cr0, is calculated by
dividing the price of a unit of public good P by the population of the receiving
municipality Nr0 (see equation 3). The optimal quantity of public goods in the poor
sending municipality is denoted by Zp0 while that in the rich receiving municipality is
denoted by Zr0 (see figure 2).
Cp0= P/ Np0

(2)

Cr0= P/ Nr0

(3)
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Figure 2 Model of two homogeneous municipalities

Economic surplus is defined as the gain when a consumer purchases a product with
a price lower than his/her highest willingness-to-pay. In economics, a demand curve is
people’s highest willingness-to-pay. Since people in the poor sending municipality only
pay Cp0 for each unit of public good, the triangle A in figure 2 is the poor’s economic
surplus before housing mobility programs were adopted. Similarly, people in the rich
receiving municipality only pay Cr0 rather than Dr so the triangle B in figure 2 is the
non-poor’s economic surplus before housing mobility programs were adopted.

2.2 Impact of the poor’s out-migration on the poor sending municipality
Figure 3 is used to analyze the change of people’s economic surplus in the sending
municipality after housing mobility programs help some low-income persons move out of
the poor sending municipality. The number of these movers is denoted by Np1. Decreased
population (from Np0 to Np0 - Np1) means fewer people share the unit price of public
goods P. Therefore, the poor’s shared cost after housing mobility programs, Cp1 (see
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equation 4), is larger18 than the poor’s shared cost before housing mobility programs, Cp0
(see equation 2), so the line Cp1 in figure 3 is higher than Cp0.
Cp1= P/ (Np0- Np1)

(4)

Figure 3 The economic surplus of the poor in the sending municipality

With the new shared cost (Cp1), the new optimal quantity of public goods should be
Zp1 and the poor’s economic surplus should decrease to A1 (see figure 3). However,
considering that local governments do not demolish built public goods for decreasing
population, the quantity of public goods is still fixed at Zp0. Therefore, besides the
economic surplus A1, people have economic loss E (see figure 3), which is defined as the
amount people pay that is higher than their highest willingness-to-pay (the demand curve).
Thus, the poor’s economic surplus is A1- E after housing mobility programs were
adopted.
The assumption of fixed taxes raises a question on how the poor pay the extra loss E
(see figure 3) if they still pay the same amount of tax and have the same quantity of
public goods Zp0. Since the poor still pay the same amount of tax while their shared cost
increases (from Cp0 to Cp1), it means the tax can cover fewer public goods (Zp1). When
18

Equation 2 and 4 show that Cp0 and Cp1 have the same numerator, P, but Cp1 has a smaller denominator
than Cp0 does and thus Cp1 is larger than Cp0.
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the tax is distributed to more than this new optimal quantity of public goods, there may
not be enough for maintenance fees, management fee and other fees to assure the same
quality of public goods. Thus, E is paid in a form of decreasing quality of public goods.
Decreasing economic surplus (from A to A1-E in figure 3) increases people’s
motivation to move out to the rich receiving municipality. The more the number of people
who move out, the higher shared cost will be. As the shared cost gradually increases, A1
(see figure 3) gradually shrinks and E (see figure 3) gradually swells, meaning that the
quality of public goods gradually decreases. This decreased quality of public goods
further strengthens people’s motivation to exit. In other words, the more people move out,
the motivation to move out increases.

2.3 Impact of the poor’s in-migration on the rich receiving municipality
After the poor’s in-migration breaks the status of homogeneous population in the
rich receiving municipality, property taxation starts to take effect. Some variables are
needed to calculate the new shared costs of different economic classes. As mentioned in
section 2.2, Np1 is the number of low-income persons moving from the poor sending
municipality to the rich receiving municipality. These low-income persons’ new shared
cost is denoted by Cp2 while the non-poor’s shared cost is denoted by Cr1. The ratio of Cp2
and Cr1 is X: 1, and X is larger than 0 but smaller than 1 because the poor pay less shared
cost than the non-poor do due to property taxation (see equation 5). Equation 5 shows,
based on this ratio, the shared cost paid by a poor person (Cp2) equals X times the shared
cost paid by a non-poor person (Cr1), meaning the shared cost from one poor person is
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equivalent to the shared cost from X non-poor person19. Thus, the shared cost from Np1
new low-income comers is equivalent to the shared cost from Np1* X non-poor persons.
This relationship can convert the number of poor persons into the non-poor-population
unit so that the researcher can calculate the shared cost of a non-poor person (Cr1) (see
equation 6). Based on equation 5, the poor’s shared cost (Cp2) is calculated by equation 7.
(The example20 in footnote may make these equations easier to understand.)
Cp2: Cr1= X : 1, while 0 < X < 1; thus, Cp2 = X* Cr1

(5)

Cr1= P/ (Nr0+ Np1* X)

(6)

Cp2= X* Cr1= X* [P/ (Nr0+ Np1* X)]

(7)

Figure 4 shows the change of the non-poor’s economic surplus in the receiving
municipality after some housing mobility program participants move in. Equation 3 and 6
show that Cr0 and Cr1 have the same numerator, P, but Cr1 has a larger denominator than
Cr0 does, which means Cr0> Cr1. This relationship implies that although property taxation
allows the poor to pay relatively less for each unit of public goods than the non-poor do,
the non-poor’s shared cost after some poor persons move in still decreases from Cr0 to Cr1
because more people (the denominator) share the same price of a unit of public good (the
numerator). Therefore, as shown in figure 4, the line Cr1 is lower than Cr0. And since the
poor pay less shared cost than the non-poor do, the line Cp2 is lower than Cr1 in figure 4.

19

For example, if the poor only have to pay half of the non-poor’s shared cost, meaning X = 0.5, then the
shared cost from a poor person is equivalent to the shared cost from 0.5 non-poor person.
20
This example uses numbers to show how to calculate Cr1 and Cp2. Assuming P is 10,000 dollars and 10
non-poor persons live in the rich municipality, each person has to pay 10,000/10=1,000 for each unit of
public goods before housing mobility programs were adopted. Assuming 5 poor people move in and the
ratio of the poor’s shared cost and the non-poor’s shared cost is X : 1= 0.8:1, the shared cost of a non-poor
person will be 10,000/(10 + 5* 0.8)= 10000/14 ≒ 714.28 while the shared cost of a poor person will be
0.8* [10,000/(10 + 5* 0.8)] ≒ 571.42. Thus, each unit of public goods is shared by the ten non-poor
persons paying 714.28* 10≒ 7143 dollars and the five poor person paying 571.42* 5≒ 2857. (Note:
10000= 7143+ 2857)
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Figure 4 The economic surplus of the non-poor in the receiving municipality

With the non-poor’s new shared cost (Cr1), the new optimal quantity of public goods
for the non-poor should be Zr1 and their economic surplus should increase to B+ F1+ F2
(see figure 4) if the quantity of public goods can easily be adjusted to the change of
people’s demand. However, construction of public goods takes time, so the quantity of
public goods may still be fixed at Zr0 and thus the non-poor do not have the economic
surplus F2 (see figure 4). Moreover, local government may not be able to quickly adjust
tax rate for the changed population in the short term, so the non-poor still pay the same
amount of tax even though their shared cost decreases. With the decreased shared cost,
the same amount of tax paid by the non-poor should be able to purchase more public
goods. However, since the quantity of public goods is fixed at Zr0, G (see figure 4) is
identified as economic loss; this represents the public goods the non-poor pay for but
cannot obtain in the short term. After considering the assumptions of fixed quantity of
public goods and fixed tax, the non-poor’s economic surplus is (B+ F1+ F2)- F2- G, which
equals B+ F1- G (see figure 4), after housing mobility programs were adopted.
The impact of the poor’s in-migration on the congestion cost of public goods also
needs to be considered. Theoretically, pure public goods tend to have unlimited excess
capacity because of their features of non-rivalry and non-excludability. However, not all
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goods provided by governments are pure public goods. Figure 5 shows that the average
cost of public goods gradually decreases as an increasing population shares the cost, and
then gradually increases as the population starts to cause congestion cost. In other words,
the excess capacity will disappear when the number of users increases to a certain level
(see N* in figure 5). Since the effects of property taxation and externalities may make
local governments engage in public good competition and thus over-provide public goods
(see Chapter II), congestion cost may not occur right after the poor move to the rich
receiving municipality. However, if congestion cost occurs, the economic surplus of the
non-poor after housing mobility programs would be B+ F1- G- congestion cost (see figure
4). The time when congestion cost occurs depends on the amount of excess capacity of
public goods in the receiving municipality and the number of poor persons moving in to
the receiving municipality during a given time.

Figure 5 Optimal jurisdiction size21
Source: Brueckner (2011: 175)

The non-poor’s motivation of moving out is analyzed by comparing their economic
surplus before and after housing mobility programs were adopted. If their economic
surplus is the same or increases, the non-poor tend to stay even though the poor move in.

21

Tiebout thinks each local government will eventually reach this optimal jurisdiction population size
where shared cost is the lowest and no congestion cost occurs.
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If their economic surplus decreases, the non-poor have motivation to move out. After
subtracting the non-poor’s economic surplus before housing mobility programs from the
economic surplus after housing mobility programs, the change of the non-poor’s
economic surplus equals F1- G- congestion cost (see figure 4). Although this equation
cannot reveal whether the non-poor will move out or not, it implies that a dramatic
increase of poor population in a short time may cause high congestion cost, thus
increasing the likelihood of out-migration of the non-poor.

2.4 Dynamic economic model based on both impacts
If the federal government adopts no other supporting measures except dispersal of
the poor, the dynamic model predicts out-migration of the non-poor based on the impact
of the poor’s out-migration on the sending municipality and the impact of the poor’s
in-migration on the receiving municipality. Both impacts showed how housing mobility
programs affect the bundle of public goods and shared cost and therefore may cause
further migration. After housing mobility programs help some low-income persons move
out of the poor sending municipality, the remaining poor people’s motivation to move out
increases because the tax revenue collected from the decreased population may not be
able to cover the expenses to maintain the same quality of public goods in the sending
municipality (see section 2.2). With active housing mobility programs, these low-income
persons are able to move to the rich municipality. Unfortunately, the more poor people
move in to the receiving municipality in a short term, the more likely that the non-poor’s
economic surplus decreases because of the increase of congestion cost, thus enhancing
the possibility of the non-poor’s out-migration (see section 2.3). The exodus of the

53

non-poor implies that housing mobility programs’ expected positive impact of wealthier
residents on low-income persons is questionable.
Based on this dynamic economic model of urban migration, the impact of housing
mobility programs on the residential decisions of different economic classes may cause
three long-term negative consequences. First, the problem of urban sprawl may be
aggravated. When the non-poor decide to move out of the receiving municipality, they
prefer municipalities with fewer poor people to municipalities where the poor
predominate because of the redistributive nature of property taxation. Most poor people
live in central cities because the accessibility to public transportation in central cities is
better than that in suburbs (Glaeser, Kahn, & Rappaport, 2008). Therefore, the non-poor
tend to move to the suburbs, thus worsening the problem of urban sprawl.
Second, instead of solving poverty or poverty concentration, the number of poor
municipalities increases after the receiving municipality turns into a new poor
municipality due to the out-migration of the non-poor. In other words, without supporting
measures, housing mobility programs can only temporarily break the segregation
between different economic classes because housing mobility programs do not alter the
nature of fiscal decentralization, which makes the non-poor want to move out of the
receiving municipality to avoid subsidizing the poor. Thus, once the poor’s in-migration
starts to decrease the non-poor’s economic surplus and causes the exodus of the non-poor,
the problem of poverty concentration will be produced in the receiving municipality. The
whole process is expensive22 and does not solve the problem. Policies that disperse the
poor to solve poverty concentration may actually create more municipalities suffering

22

The cost included not only monetary cost like administration cost to implement the policies, the cost for
the poor to move, and the cost for the non-poor to move but also nonmonetary costs like replacement cost.
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from poverty concentration after the non-poor out-migrate.
Third, the poor’s economic surplus in both the original poor municipality and the
new poor municipality (the receiving municipality after the out-migration of the non-poor)
becomes smaller after the whole dynamic of migration. Since the total population of the
poor (Np0) are scattered to both the original poor municipality and the new poor
municipality, both municipalities have fewer persons to share the cost for each unit of
public goods; thus, the poor’s shared cost in both municipalities increases. Assume that
when the number of low-income in-migrants increases from Np1 to Np2, the non-poor in
the receiving municipality start to out-migrate. In the original poor municipality (the
sending municipality), the further decreased population from Np0 - Np1 to Np0 - Np2 makes
the remaining poor pay higher shared cost from Cp1 to Cp3 (see equation 8) and have
smaller economic surplus from A1- E (see figure 3) to A11- E- J (see figure 6). In the new
poor municipality, the poor no longer have the non-poor’s subsidies on public goods after
the out-migration of the non-poor. Therefore, the shared cost of the poor in the new poor
municipality increases from Cp2 to Cp4 (see equation 9), and the economic surplus
decrease to H-I (see figure 6). Comparing with the poor’s condition before housing
mobility programs, the poor in both the original poor municipality and the new poor
municipality pay higher shared cost for lower quality of public goods after the whole
dynamic of migration.
Cp3= P/ (Np0- Np2)

(8)

Cp4= P/ (Np2)

(9)
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Figure 6 The economic surplus of the poor after the out-migration of the non-poor

The implication of this dynamic model is that housing mobility programs only
relieved the symptom of the problem (economic segregation/ poverty concentration) but
failed to tackle the root cause of the problem (political fragmentation/ fiscal
decentralization) so the problem may become more serious rather than be solved.
Housing mobility programs broke the economic segregation by improving the poor’s
residential mobility. However, the programs did not change the nature of fiscal
decentralization so the individual behavior (the out-migration of the non-poor) under a
decentralized fiscal system may reproduce the problem of poverty concentration and
create other urban problems like urban sprawl. Under a decentralized fiscal system, the
cost of local public goods is shared by everyone in the same municipality. And property
taxation means a non-poor person pays relatively more shared cost for each unit of public
goods than a poor person does, which implies that housing mobility programs rely on the
non-poor in the receiving localities to subsidize the poor on public goods through
property taxation and hope the accessibility to adequate public goods and resources can
help improve the poor’s economic self-sufficiency. This dynamic economic model
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suggested that, under a decentralized fiscal system, the in-migration of the poor may
eventually cause the exodus of wealthier residents23. After the out-migration of wealthier
residents, the poor who successfully moved into the receiving municipality may still live
in a municipality with poverty concentration (the new poverty-concentrated
municipality).

23

There are other programs that may also affect the spatial distribution of different economic classes, like
HOPE VI programs, which dispersed the poor and aimed to revitalize sending localities to attract wealthy
people. However, this research focused only on analyzing the impact of the housing mobility programs
which relocated low-income families to low-poverty receiving localities.

57

CHAPTER IV
HYPOTHESES, METHOD, AND DATA

Statistical models are designed to analyze the impact of housing mobility programs
on migration of the wealthier residents in receiving municipalities because the migration
of the non-poor is closely related to both the effectiveness of housing mobility programs
and the three possible long-term consequences deduced from the dynamic economic
model. Two hypotheses are tested to analyze this impact. This chapter describes the
method and data for each hypothesis respectively.

1. Hypothesis I
The first hypothesis is tested to judge whether residents of municipalities with a
higher concentration of the poor also have higher welfare expenditure in addition to
subsidizing the poor through property taxation. The dynamic model does not distinguish
between different types of public goods— all people in the same municipality share the
cost for the same public goods provided in the municipality. However, there are some
public goods that are used exclusively by the poor, like health and welfare. Therefore,
this research needs to test whether the non-poor in high-poverty municipalities pay more
for public welfare and health than the non-poor in low-poverty municipalities do. If the
statement is supported by data, the extra expenses on health and welfare may increase the
likelihood that the non-poor’s economic surplus after housing mobility programs is
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smaller than that before housing mobility programs, which means the dynamic process
predicted by the economic model may happen faster.

Null hypothesis I: The non-poor in high-poverty municipalities pay the same for
public welfare and health as the non-poor in low-poverty municipalities do.
Although it may appear to be common sense that local governments with more poor
people in their jurisdictions spend more on public welfare and health and thus the
non-poor in the same jurisdiction are taxed more, this common sense may not be true for
two reasons. First, local governments may impose restrictions on welfare recipients to
avoid attracting the in-migrants who increase the welfare expenditure yet provide few
taxes (Brueckner, 2000; Ferreira, et al., 2005: 298; Imbroscio, 2004a: 584-585; Kantor,
1995: 4). Second, local governments receive financial aid from state governments and
grants from the federal government. After subtracting these intergovernmental funds, the
expenditure on public welfare and health paid by each non-poor person may not be so
different between high-poverty municipalities and low-poverty municipalities. Since it is
unclear whether or not the non-poor have to pay extra expenses on health and welfare
besides subsidizing the poor through property taxation, hypothesis I must be tested.

1.1 ANOVA
ANOVA is used to test the null hypothesis I. This statistical model is used to
determine whether samples from two or more groups come from populations with equal
means (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010: 440). Therefore, ANOVA is an
appropriate statistical model to test if there is any significant difference in the non-poor’s
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payment for welfare and health expenditure between high-poverty municipalities and
low-poverty municipalities. The assumptions of ANOVA, the dependent variable, and the
independent variable (the groups) are described as follows.

Assumptions of ANOVA
ANOVA has three assumptions. First, the observations should be independent of one
another. The data meet this assumption because the budget of each municipality is
independent. Therefore, no test for this assumption is needed. Second, the population
variances of each group should be the same. Levene’s test is used to examine if the data
meet the assumption of equal variance. Third, distribution within each group is normally
distributed. The Shapiro-Wilk test is used to examine if the data meet the assumption of
normality. Since the model includes two groups, the normality of each group will be
tested respectively.

Dependent variable
The dependent variable (DV) is the local expenditure on health and welfare paid by
every 1000 non-poor citizens (see equation 10). The dependent variable is calculated by
subtracting the federal government’s and state government’s grants in aid on health and
welfare from local governments’ expenditure on health and welfare and then dividing it
by the population of the non-poor. According to the Census Bureau, the poor were
defined as “the families and persons whose total family income or unrelated individual
income was less than the poverty threshold specified for the applicable family size, age of
householder, and number of related children under 18 present” (Slater & Hall, 1993:
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D-17). The non-poor were defined as the families and persons whose total family income
or unrelated individual income was more than the poverty threshold. The poverty
thresholds can be found in appendix 2 (see table 15).
LG' s exp on H & W - Aid on H & W from SG or FG (in thousands)
DV=
the non‐poor population (in thousands)

(10)

Note: LG’s exp on H & W: Local governments’ expenditure on health and welfare
Aid on H & W from SG or FG: Aid on health and welfare from state governments
and the federal government
Due to the limitation of data availability, this research uses financial data from 1991
and only includes municipalities with a 1986 population larger than 300,000 to test
hypothesis I. The calculate the dependent variable requires local government level data
on the federal government’s grant on different categories, state governments’ financial aid
on different categories, and local governments’ expenditure on different categories.
However, the Census Bureau stopped producing data about state governments’ financial
aid on different categories to each local government in 1992. Thus, the data in 1991 are
the latest data available. Also, this data are only available for municipalities with a 1986
population of 300,000 or more (City government finances: 1990-91, 1993: x). The 1986
population was only used by the Census Bureau to decide which municipalities’ data
would be collected. Data on expenditure remains the data in the fiscal year 1991.

Independent variable
Figure 7 is used to explain the criteria to define high-poverty municipalities and
low-poverty municipalities. These two types of municipalities are relative concepts.
Therefore, as long as the two groups of municipalities have distinctively different poverty

61

rates, the data of the two groups can be used to test hypothesis I. Considering that the
poverty rate of America in 1991 was 14.2%24 and only three municipalities had a poverty
rate smaller than 10%, low-poverty municipalities are defined as municipalities with a
poverty rate no higher than 15%. Although municipalities with a poverty rate higher than
20% in 1990s were considered as high-poverty municipalities25, the research intends to
widen the difference of poverty rates between the two groups and therefore defines
high-poverty municipalities as municipalities with a poverty rate higher than 25%. Thus,
group 1 includes 15 low-poverty municipalities while group 2 includes 9 high-poverty
municipalities. The geographic distribution of these 24 municipalities can be found in
appendix 3 (see figure 9). Low-poverty municipalities were coded as 0 while
high-poverty municipalities were coded as 1.

Figure 7 The number of municipalities within different ranges of poverty rates

1.2 Data collection
Table 1 shows the sources of data needed for the ANOVA model. The fiscal year for
financial data is across 1990 and 1991. Since the Census Bureau did not conduct a

24

The data are from the Census Bureau website:
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/historical/people.html
25
Five poor cities were selected in the MTO program, which moved the poor to other wealthier places. The
average poverty rate of these five cities in 1990 was about 20%. (Baltimore (21.9%), Boston (18.7%),
Chicago (21.6%), Los Angeles (18.9%), New York (19.3%), and the average (20.08%))
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population survey at the municipality level in 1991, this research will use the data on
total population and poverty rate in 1990 instead. (These two variables are needed to
calculate the non-poor population for equation 10.)
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Table 1 Sources of the data for the ANOVA model
Data

Sources

Note

Federal funds on health and family welfare to 1993 County and City Extra: Annual Fiscal year: from October 1st,
each local government ($1,000)
Metro, City and County Data Book
1990 to September 30th, 1991
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State governments’ funds on public welfare
City Government Finances: 1990-1991
to each local government ($1,000)

Fiscal year: from July 1st, 1990
to June 30th, 1991

State governments’ funds on health and
City Government Finances: 1990-1991
hospital to each local government ($1,000)

Fiscal year: from July 1st, 1990
to June 30th, 1991

Each local government's expenditure on
City Government Finances: 1990-1991
public welfare ($1,000)

Fiscal year: from July 1st, 1990
to June 30th, 1991

Each local government's expenditure on
City Government Finances: 1990-1991
hospital ($1,000)

Fiscal year: from July 1st, 1990
to June 30th, 1991

Each local government's expenditure on
City Government Finances: 1990-1991
health ($1,000)

Fiscal year: from July 1st, 1990
to June 30th, 1991

Total population

Census Bureau

1990

Poverty rate

Census Bureau

1990

2. Hypothesis II
This hypothesis is to test the main finding from the economic model, which shows
that housing mobility programs may lead to the out-migration of the non-poor because
the federal government did not change fiscal decentralization by compensating receiving
municipalities and therefore the in-migration of the poor may affect local taxes and public
goods, which stimulate vote-with-feet behavior. This section explains why affordable
housing programs in low-poverty municipalities were selected for analysis and describes
the time frame of the data, the statistical model, and the sources of data on each variable.

Null hypothesis II: Federal affordable housing programs have no impact on the
out-migration of wealthier residents in low-poverty receiving municipalities.

2.1 Why select affordable housing programs in low-poverty municipalities
Since most housing mobility programs increase participants’ residential mobility by
subsidizing housing expenses, affordable housing programs were selected for analysis,
and only the affordable housing programs in low-poverty municipalities (below 15
percent) were considered as housing mobility programs in this research. This choice is
based on two criteria. First, programs must constantly exist in order to test the dynamic
economic model which is based on the assumption that housing mobility programs
improve the residential mobility of low-income families so that they can move to other
municipalities. If housing mobility programs were only active for a few years, the poor
with move-out motivation later on would not be able to move to receiving municipalities.
Since affordable housing programs continuously help the poor move to areas with greater
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opportunity by providing rental assistance (Retsinas & Belsky, 2008: 44), the programs
are appropriate for the analysis. Selecting long-duration programs also helps reveal
possible outcomes of promoting greater mobility.
Second, affordable housing programs must be located in low-poverty municipalities.
Moving low-income families to other high-poverty municipalities is not considered a
successful housing mobility program. Therefore, not all affordable housing programs
were considered as housing mobility programs. Unlike hypothesis I, the data for
hypothesis II only includes municipalities with a poverty rate lower than 15 percent for
analysis. Only the affordable housing programs located in these low-poverty
municipalities can help the poor move into low-poverty municipalities and thus were
considered as housing mobility programs.
In this research, affordable housing programs include the following programs:
public housing programs, Section 8 new construction or substantial rehabilitation
programs, Section 236 programs, rental assistance program, rent supplement, and low
income housing tax credit (LIHTC) programs. These programs adopted different
approaches to provide affordable housing. Some were constructed by governments while
the others were constructed by private owners who received benefits like subsidies, lower
mortgage interest rates, or lower housing tax from the federal government. The similarity
of these programs is that they allow low-income households to pay affordable rent
(usually 30% of the household’s adjusted gross income) for apartments, thus helping the
poor move to where they otherwise could not afford.
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2.2 Time frame
The time frame in this research is from 2000 to 2012. Although the dynamic
economic model predicts the out-migration of the non-poor, it cannot predict when the
in-migration of low-income persons will reach the tipping point and start causing the
out-migration of the non-poor. Therefore, the research uses the earliest and the latest
municipality-level data (2000-2012) to test hypothesis II.

2.3 MANCOVA
MANCOVA is used because this research includes multiple dependent variables and
because other factors affecting moving decisions need to be controlled. Given that
people’s economic status may change over time, the research needs to consider both the
migration of the non-poor and the migration of the total population. MANCOVA can not
only compare group differences on multiple dependent variables but also permits
controlling other variables that may affect these dependent variables. (These control
variables are called covariates.) The following describes statistical tests used to examine
the assumptions of MANCOVA, sample selection, dependent variables, thresholds to
form groups (independent variable), and tentative covariates.

Assumptions of MANCOVA
The following three assumptions were tested. The first assumption is homogeneity
of variance, including univariate tests on each dependent variable and a multivariate test
on joint dependent variables. Levene’s test is used to test homogeneous population
variances on each dependent variable between groups. Box’s M test is used to test equal
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population covariance matrices for joint dependent variables between groups. If Box’s M
test rejects the null hypothesis of equal covariance matrices, generalized variance for
each group would be used to judge whether the MANCOVA results tend to be liberal
or conservative.
The second assumption is normality. Although scientists cannot completely assess
multivariate normality, researchers can at least use Shapiro-Wilk’s W test to test the
assumption of univariate normality for each dependent variable within each group. As
long as the data meet the requirement of univariate normality, departures from
multivariate normality is inconsequential (Hair et al., 2010: 461). Although nonnormality
has little effect with larger sample size (Hair et al., 2010: 460), kurtosis still needs to be
examined because platykurtosis26 on a dependent variable within a group decreases
statistical power. Thus, if Shapiro-Wilk’s W tests reject the null hypothesis of univariate
normality, the 95% confidence interval of kurtosis for each dependent variable within
each group would be examined. If the intervals include 0 (normal distribution) or include
only positive numbers (leptokurtic distribution 27 ), nonnormality does not decrease
statistical power.
The third assumption is homogeneity of regression slopes for one covariate;
parallelism of regression planes for two covariates; and homogeneity of regression
hyperplanes for more than two covariates (Pituch, Whittaker, & Stevens, 2007: 300). This
assumption is tested by examining if the interaction term of covariates and an
independent variable is significantly correlated with the dependent variables. If the
correlation is insignificant, the research can retain the null hypothesis of homogeneous

26
27

Platykurtosis is a distribution with a lower peak height than that in a normal distribution.
Leptokurtosis is a distribution with a higher peak height than that in a normal distribution.

68

regression hyperplanes.

Sample selection
Subjects are low-poverty municipalities (below 15 percent) with a population of
65,000 or more and without a boundary change or HOPE VI programs during the time
from 2000 to 2012. After collecting data, this research adopted the following steps to find
appropriate samples for the analysis. First, municipality-level data from governments,
like the Census Bureau or the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), usually include both incorporated places and census designated places (CDPs).
This research excludes CDPs because only municipalities with the power to decide its tax
and public goods are appropriate for the analysis. Thus, incorporated places, defined as “a
type of governmental unit incorporated under state law having legally prescribed powers
and functions28”, are appropriate, but CDPs, which are statistical areas delineated based
on concentrations of population by name but not legally incorporated under the laws of
the state29, are inappropriate for the analysis of this research. Second, municipalities with
a poverty rate higher than 15 percent were excluded because only low-poverty
municipalities are considered receiving localities of housing mobility programs. Third,
municipalities with HOPE VI programs during 2000 and 2012 were excluded because
HOPE VI, which required the poor to leave and attracted the non-poor to move in, greatly
influenced the distribution of different economic classes and thus may bias the results.
Fourth, municipalities with boundary changes during 2000 and 2012 were excluded

28

The definition of incorporated place can be found in the website of the Census Glossary
(https://www.census.gov/glossary/#term_Incorporatedplace).
29
The definition of CDP can be found in the website of the Census Glossary
(https://www.census.gov/glossary/#term_CensusDesignatedPlaceCDP).
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because boundary changes could bias the data on the dependent variables and other
covariates. After the above process, the appropriate sample includes 284 municipalities.

Dependent variables
The percentage of population change was used as the measurements of
out-migration because the Census Bureau does not produce data on out-migration (It only
produces in-migration data). Considering that people’s economic status may change over
time, the research includes two dependent variables: The first dependent variable (DV1)
is the percentage of the non-poor population change between 2000 and 2012 (see
equation 11). The second dependent variable (DV2) is the percentage of the total
population change between 2000 and 2012 (see equation 12). This research used the
poverty thresholds from the Census Bureau to determine the poor and the non-poor. The
non-poor were defined as the persons who were not classified as below the poverty level.
The poverty thresholds were adjusted by the Census Bureau each year. The poverty
thresholds for 2000 and 2012 can be found in appendix 2 (see table 16 and table 17).
DV1

Non‐poor in 2012 – Non‐poor in 2000
* 100%
Non‐poor in 2000

DV2

Total population in 2012 – Total population in 2000
Total population in 2000

11
* 100%

12

Independent variable
The independent variable is the two groups. Group 1 (G1) is low-poverty
municipalities with no/few low-income affordable housing program participants while
group 2 (G2) is low-poverty municipalities with many low-income affordable housing
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program participants. Considering that some poor people had already moved in
low-poverty municipalities before 2000, this research cannot simply sum up the total
units provided by each affordable housing program and decide which municipalities
belong to which group because if most affordable housing units in a municipality had
been occupied in 2000, few poor people could actually move in the municipality after
2000. Thus, equation 13 and 14 were used to calculate the number of poor persons who
can move in to low-poverty municipality j through affordable housing program i after
2000, denoted by Pi_after2000. (The research first calculated the percentage of vacant
affordable housing units, then multiplied it by total housing units to obtain the number of
vacant affordable housing units, and then multiplied the product by the average number
of people per unit to estimate the number of poor persons who can move in to
municipality j through affordable housing program i.) Considering that some programs do
not have data on average size of household, namely people_per_unit_i, for some
municipalities, the research assumes that each unit can at least have one person living
there. Thus, equation 13 is used when data on people_per_unit_i is available while
equation 14 is used when the data is not available (see table 2). Pi_ after2000 of each
affordable housing program was summed up to calculate the total number of program
participants after 2000, denoted by total p movers (see equation 15).
Pi_ after2000= total_units_i * (1- pct_occupied_i)* people_per_unit_i

(13)

Pi_ after2000= total_units_i * (1- pct_occupied_i)* 1

(14)

total p movers= ∑i Pi_ after2000

(15)

Note:
total_units_i: total housing units provided by program i
pct_occupied_i: the percentage of occupied units in program i
people_per_unit_i: the average number of people per unit in program i
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Table 2 Format of data on affordable housing programs
Program 1

Program i

Unit % P/unit P1
Municipality 1 A

A

A

…

Unit % P/unit Pi

(13) A

A

N/A

(14)

total p movers
= ∑ Pij
P11+ P21+…

Municipality 2

P12+ P22+…

Municipality j

…

Note: A: available.

N/A: not available.

The population scale of municipalities also needs to be considered. If the number of
total p movers is very small in terms of the non-poor population in a municipality,
affordable housing programs may not have an impact on migration. Therefore, the
number of total p movers was divided by the non-poor population in 2000 to adjust
different population scales of municipalities30 (see equation 16). This variable is denoted
by P/1000R, meaning the number of poor persons every 1000 non-poor persons have to
take care of.
P/1000R= total p movers/ the non-poor population in 2000 (in thousands)

(16)

Although the dynamic economic model predicts the out-migration of the non-poor, it
does not predict the threshold of poor program participants which will start to cause the
out-migration. Therefore, this research uses four different thresholds (see figure 8) to

30

The same number of additional poor population may not have the same effects on different
municipalities. Assume that municipality A has 1,000 non-poor persons while municipality B has 200,000
non-poor persons, and each municipality has 200 additional poor persons who may move in to the
municipality in the future. For municipality A, additional expenses on a poor person are shared by 5
non-poor persons (200/1,000= 1/5), while for municipality B, the same expenses are shared by 1,000
non-poor persons (200/200,000=1/1,000). Although both municipalities have 200 additional poor persons
moving in, different population scales of municipalities mean that the extra expenses on these 200 poor
persons are shared by different numbers of the non-poor.
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form the two groups and runs four MANCOVA models. After P/1000R was calculated,
municipalities were sorted by P/1000R in ascending order. Among 284 municipalities,
only 23 municipalities had no potential poor program participants (P/1000R= 0). The
first threshold (T1) included these 23 municipalities as group 1 and included
municipalities with P/1000R larger than the mean31 as group 2. The second threshold (T2)
also included the 23 municipalities as group 1 but included municipalities with P/1000R
larger than the median32 as group 2. Although the group size of 23 meets the practical
guide, which suggests 20 observations as the minimum sample size for each group,
analysis with a group size of fewer than 30 observations is difficult to obtain desired
statistical power (Hair et al., 2010: 453, 465). Therefore, this research also uses the third
and fourth threshold (T3 and T4) to form the two groups (see figure 8). The third
threshold divided the 284 municipalities into three groups and included 95 municipalities
(284/ 3≒ 95) with the smallest P/1000R as the first group33 and 95 municipalities with
the largest P/1000R as the second group34. The fourth threshold divided the total sample
into four groups and included 71 municipalities (284/ 4= 71) with the smallest P/1000R
as the first group35 and 71 municipalities with the largest P/1000R as the second group36.
The geographic distribution of the two groups of municipalities formed by different
thresholds can be found in appendix 3 (see figure 10, figure 11, figure 12, and figure 13).
Low-poverty municipalities with no/few affordable housing program participants (G1)
were coded as 0 while low-poverty municipalities with more affordable housing program

31
32
33
34
35
36

The mean of P/1000R of the 284 municipalities is 1.76.
The median of P/1000R of the 284 municipalities is 0.785.
Group 1 includes 95 low-poverty municipalities with P/1000R ranging from 0 to 0.272.
Group 2 includes 95 low-poverty municipalities with P/1000R ranging from 1.672 to 15.313.
Group 1 includes 71 low-poverty municipalities with P/1000R ranging from 0 to 0.160.
Group 2 includes 71 low-poverty municipalities with P/1000R ranging from 2.265 to 15.313.
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participants (G2) were coded as 1.

Figure 8 Four thresholds to form groups

Tentative covariates
Based on the American Housing Survey (2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011)37
and relevant literature, six tentative covariates were selected to be considered for
inclusion in the MANCOVA models to remove extraneous variation in the dependent
variables. The bivariate correlation coefficients of each tentative covariate with the
dependent variables and independent variable (groups) were tested in order to decide
appropriate covariates to be included in the MANCOVA models. Covariates must have
significant correlations with the dependent variables; otherwise, including them cannot
remove extraneous variation and thus cannot improve the models. However, covariates
should not be significantly correlated with the independent variable (groups); otherwise,
MANCOVA may remove parts of the impact of groups on the dependent variables while
removing the impact of covariates on the dependent variables. By removing covariates’
37

The American Housing Survey investigates people’s main reason for leaving previous residences every
two years.
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impacts on the dependent variables, it is possible to focus on the group differences on the
dependent variables. The following describes the six tentative covariates, including the
percentage of population with long travel time, the construction of new housing units, the
change of racial/ethnic composition, the change of crime rate, and region.

Tentative covariate 1 (C1): the percentage of population with long travel time
This covariate was selected because the American Housing Survey (2001, 2003,
2005, 2007, 2009, 2011) indicated that job related reasons, like "new job or job transfer"
and "to be closer to work/ school/ other," had always been one of the main reasons people
relocate. Therefore, this research assumes that the higher percentage of population with
long travel time, the higher percentage of population with motivation to move out, which
means the smaller the dependent variables are. Ideally, data on this covariate should be
collected in 2000 because any survey after people moving to a place closer to work
cannot reveal people’s original long travel time. However, 2005 was the first year the
Census Bureau started producing this data so data from 2005 was used in this research.
“Long travel time” is defined as travel time longer than 30 minutes, which is based on the
national-level data in each available year (2005-2012). The data showed that the mean
travel time to work for workers in America was slightly more than 25 minutes38. Table 3
shows the data pattern. Equation 17 is used to calculate this covariate. The numerator is
the population whose travel time to work in 2005 was longer than 30 minutes while the
denominator is the total population in 2005.

38

The mean travel time to work for workers in America from 2005 to 2012 is 25.1, 25.0, 25.3, 25.5, 25.1,
25.3, 25.5, and 25.7 minutes respectively.
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Table 3 Data of travel time to work from the Census Bureau
Subject

Municipality 1

Workers 16 years and over who did not work at
home
Travel time to work

a

Less than 10 minutes

b1 %

10 to 14 minutes

b2 %

15 to 19 minutes

b3 %

20 to 24 minutes

b4 %

25 to 29 minutes

b5 %

30 to 34 minutes

b6 %

35 to 44 minutes

b7 %

45 to 59 minutes

b8 %

60 or more minutes

b9 %

Mean travel time to work (minutes)

Municipality …

c

Workers in 2005 * % of workers with travel time 30 min or more
*100%
Total population in 2005

(17)39

Tentative covariate 2 (C2): the construction of new housing units from 2000 to 2012
This tentative covariate was selected because, according to the American Housing
Survey (2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011), the housing related reasons, like “to
establish own household”, “needed larger house or apartment”, and “wanted better home,”
were among the reasons people move. Although home buyers’ preferences may be
diverse, this research assumes that developers would try to meet the market needs in
order to make profits. Therefore, the construction of new housing units was selected as
the second tentative covariate. The same housing supply may be very large or very small

39

Take the data in table 3 for example. The calculation of this covariate is [a* (b6+ b7+ b8+ b9)]/ total
population in 2005.
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in terms of the population in a municipality so the total supply of new housing units from
2000 to 2012 was divided by the total population in 2000 to adjust different population
scales of municipalities (see equation 18). The smaller this covariate is, the higher
likelihood that people cannot find their ideal houses in the same municipality, causing
them to move out for ideal housing. This out-migration means the dependent variables
would be smaller.
The construction of new housing units from 2000 to 2012
Total population in 2000

(18)

Tentative covariates 3: the change of racial/ethnic composition
Race is another factor which may affect residential decisions. Research indicated
that white flight was significantly related to the size of the minority population in the
neighborhood (Crowder, 2000; Crowder & South, 2008). Also, most research focused on
how the composition in black and white residents affects people’s decision to stay or exit
a neighborhood (Ellen, 2000: 7, 104-130). For example, Schelling’s tipping model (1971)
suggests that an increase of blacks in an integrated neighborhood attracts black buyers to
purchase a house there but also decreases the interest of white home buyers and motivates
white residents to move out (Dixit & Nalebuff, 2008 [2009]: 219-221).
This research includes two tentative covariates about the change of racial/ethnic
composition: One is about non-white and white residents (C3-A) and the other is about
black and white residents (C3-B). Equation 19 is used to measure the change of
non-white/white composition between 2000 and 2012 while equation 20 is used to
measure the change of black/white composition between 2000 and 2012.
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Race=

Non-White in 2000
Non-White in 2012
‐
White in 2012
White in 2000

(19)

Race=

Black in 2012
Black in 2000
‐
White in 2012
White in 2000

(20)

Although a survey of the literature on racial preferences suggested that people were
concerned about racial mix of their neighborhoods, some research indicated that the
magnitude of actual white departure was small (Ellen, 2000: 7-8). Ellen’s research (2000)
indicated that racial/ethnic composition was less influential in move-out decisions than in
move-in decisions. Since the association between the racial/ethnic composition and
people’s out-migration is unresolved by the literature, the research cannot predict the
direction of this association. However, the correlation between each covariate and the
dependent variables were tested to decide if covariates would be included in the model.

Tentative covariate 4 (C4): the change of crime rate between 2000 and 2012
Since crimes were associated with urban flight (Cullen & Levitt, 1999), the change
of crime rate between 2000 and 2012 was also selected as a tentative covariate.
According to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), crime rates are shown as rates per
100,000 population and are calculated by equation 21. Only violent crimes and property
crimes were counted as crime cases in this research. Equation 22 is used to calculate this
covariate. This research assumes that as this covariate increases, the percentage of
move-out population increases, meaning the dependent variables would be smaller.
Crime rate=

the number of crime cases
*100,000
total population

△ Crime rate= Crime rate in 2012 - Crime rate in 2000
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(21)
(22)

Tentative covariate 5 (C5): region
Region was selected as a tentative covariate because some regions in America have
been losing more population than others (Johnson, Voss, Hammer, Fuguitt, & Mcniven,
2005). Five-decade data from 1950s to 1990s revealed regions with continuous
in-migration (especially Florida and the Southwest) and regions with continuous
out-migration (especially the Great Plains) (Johnson, et al., 2005). The Census Bureau
divided states and the District of Columbia into four regions in 194240: Northeast41,
South42, Midwest43, and West44. This research used the same division. The covariate
region is a categorical variable indicating which of the four regions a municipality is in.

2.4 Data collection
As shown in table 4, the data needed for the MANCOVA model were collected from
the Census Bureau, HUD, or FBI. The data were gathered for different purposes which
were described in table 4. Instead of being used as a variable or being used to calculate a
variable, some data were collected simply for screening out municipalities which are not
appropriate for a test of hypothesis II, including the funding history of HOPE VI
demolition grants and revitalization grants and the list of municipalities with boundary
changes during 2000 and 2012.

40

See the definition of region in the website of the Census Glossary:
http://www.census.gov/glossary/#term_Region
41
The Northeast region includes Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode
Island, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania.
42
The South region includes Maryland, Delaware, West Virginia, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas,
and District of Columbia.
43
The Midwest region includes North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Missouri, Iowa,
Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio.
44
The West region includes Washington, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Oregon, California, Nevada, Utah,
Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, Alaska, and Hawaii.
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Table 4 Sources of the data for the MANCOVA model
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Data
Poverty rates in 2000 and 2012

Sources
Census Bureau

Total population in 2000, 2005 and 2012

Census Bureau





Funding history of HOPE VI programs

HUD




Boundary changes during 2000and 2012

Census Bureau



Total housing units of each affordable
housing program in 2000
Percentage of occupied units in each
affordable housing program in 2000
Average size of household in each
affordable housing programs in 2000
Travel time to work in 2005
Construction of new housing units
during 2000 and 2012
Population for white American alone in
2000 and 2012
Population for black or African
American alone in 2000 and 2012
Crime rates in 2000 and 2012

HUD



Note
To delete municipalities with a poverty rate larger than 15 percent
To calculate the non-poor population for DV1, DV2, and groups
Data from 2000 and 2012 was used to calculate the non-poor
population for DV1, DV2, groups, C2, and C3-A.
Data from 2005 was used to calculate C1.
To delete municipalities with HOPE VI programs during 2000
and 2012
To delete municipalities with boundary changes during 2000 and
2012
To calculate the variable that was used to decide the two groups

HUD



To calculate the variable that was used to decide the two groups

HUD



To calculate the variable that was used to decide the two groups

Census Bureau
Census Bureau




To calculate C1
To calculate C2

Census Bureau



To calculate C3-A and C3-B

Census Bureau



To calculate C3-B

Census Bureau;
FBI





To calculate C4
Crime rate in 2000 is from the Census Bureau
Crime rate in 2012 is from FBI

CHAPTER V
RESULTS

This chapter includes two sections. The first section presents the results of the
ANOVA model, which tests the null hypothesis that the non-poor in high-poverty
municipalities pay the same for public welfare and health as the non-poor in low-poverty
municipalities do. The second section presents the results of the MANCOVA model,
which tests the null hypothesis that federal affordable housing programs have no impact
on the migration of non-poor residents in low-poverty receiving municipalities.

1. Results of the ANOVA Model for Hypothesis I
The research first reviewed the descriptive statistics, then examined the assumptions
of ANOVA, and then reported the results of the ANOVA model.

1.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for each group. The sign of the dependent
variable, local expenditure on health and welfare paid by every 1000 non-poor citizens, is
negative, which means most of local expenditure on health and welfare came from
intergovernmental funds from state governments and the federal government. The mean
of the dependent variable in low-poverty municipalities was about -66,628 dollars with a
standard deviation of 182,660 dollars while the mean of the dependent variable in
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high-poverty municipalities was about -261,206 dollars with a standard deviation of
269,326 dollars. This preliminary descriptive statistics shows that high-poverty
municipalities received more intergovernmental funds on public welfare and health than
low-poverty municipalities did.

Table 5 Descriptive statistics on health and welfare paid by the local non-poor
N

Health and welfare expenditure
(in thousands)
Mean

S.D.

Group 1: Low-poverty municipalities

15

-66.62878

182.66072

Group 2: High-poverty municipalities

9

-261.20644

269.32651

1.2 Tests of ANOVA assumptions
Table 6 shows the test results of the assumptions of equal variances and normality.
Levene’s test retains the null hypothesis that the variance of the dependent variable in
low-poverty municipalities and that in high-poverty municipalities are equal (p > .05). As
to the test of normality, considering that the F test is still robust even if the dependent
variable moderately departs from normality (Agresti & Finlay, 2009: p. 401), the p-value
was set at the 0.01 level and the Shapiro-Wilk tests retain the null hypothesis of normality
for both low-poverty municipalities (p > .01) and high-poverty municipalities (p > .01).
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Table 6 Tests of ANOVA assumptions
Assumptions

Test

Sig.

Equal variances

Levene’s test

.261

Shapiro-Wilk test for group 1

.012

Normality

Shapiro-Wilk test for group 2
.036
Note: Group 1: low-poverty municipalities; Group 2: high-poverty municipalities

1.3 Results of the ANOVA model
Table 7 shows that the means of the dependent variable in the two groups are
significantly different from each other (F= 4.473, p < .05). Although the model showed a
group difference, it did not show that the non-poor pay extra taxes for public welfare and
health. Instead, as the descriptive statistics showed, the means of the dependent variable
in both groups are negative, which means not only that the expenditure on public welfare
and health mainly came from the federal government and state governments but also that
high-poverty municipalities received significantly more intergovernmental funds for
public welfare and health than low-poverty municipalities did.

Table 7 Result of the ANOVA model
Sum of squares

df

Mean square

F

Sig.

Between Groups

212965.123

1

212965.123

4.473

.046

Within Groups

1047403.285

22

47609.240

Total

1260368.408

23

2. Results of the MANCOVA Model for Hypothesis II
This section examines the results of the four MANCOVA models, each of which
used a different threshold to form the two groups (the independent variable): low-poverty
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municipalities with no/few low-income affordable housing program participants (G1) and
low-poverty municipalities with many low-income affordable housing program
participants (G2). Five parts are included in this section: descriptive statistics, correlation,
sample size, tests of MANCOVA assumptions, and findings of the MANCOVA model
which meets all MANCOVA assumptions.

2.1 Descriptive statistics for the four models
Table 8 shows the descriptive statistics of the four models. Considering that
covariates were selected only after their correlations with the dependent variables and
with the independent variable were examined, this section mainly describes the
descriptive statistics of the dependent variables.
The first model used threshold 1 (T1) to form the two groups. Group 1 includes 23
low-poverty municipalities while group 2 includes 92 low-poverty municipalities (see
figure 8). The mean of the first dependent variable (DV1) shows that the average growth
of non-poor population in group 1 from 2000 to 2012 was about 53.9% while that in
group 2 was about only 12.2%. The mean of the second dependent variable (DV2) shows
that the average growth of total population in group 1 from 2000 to 2012 was about 60%
while that in group 2 was about only 18.9%.
The second model used threshold 2 (T2) to form the two groups. Group 1 includes
23 low-poverty municipalities while group 2 includes 142 low-poverty municipalities
(see figure 8). The mean of the first dependent variable (DV1) shows that the average
growth of non-poor population in group 1 from 2000 to 2012 was also about 53.9% while
that in group 2 was about 12.9%. The mean of the second dependent variable (DV2)
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shows that the average growth of total population in group 1 from 2000 to 2012 was
about 60% while that in group 2 was about only 19.4%.
The third model used threshold 3 (T3) to form the two groups. Both groups include
95 low-poverty municipalities (see figure 8). The mean of the first dependent variable
(DV1) shows that the average growth of non-poor population in group 1 from 2000 to
2012 was about 33% while that in group 2 was about only 12.2%. The mean of the
second dependent variable (DV2) shows that the average growth of total population in
group 1 from 2000 to 2012 was about 38.6% while that in group 2 was about only 18.9%.
The fourth model used threshold 4 (T4) to form the two groups. Both groups include
71 low-poverty municipalities (see figure 8). The mean of the first dependent variable
(DV1) shows that the average growth of non-poor population in group 1 from 2000 to
2012 was about 39.4% while that in group 2 was about only 9.7%. The mean of the
second dependent variable (DV2) shows that the average growth of total population in
group 1 from 2000 to 2012 was about 44.6% while that in group 2 was about only 16.1%.
Overall, the descriptive statistics of these four models show that both the group
mean of non-poor population growth rate (DV1) and the group mean of total population
growth rate (DV2) in low-poverty municipalities with no/few affordable housing program
participants (G1) were higher than those in low-poverty municipalities with more
low-income affordable housing program participants (G2). These preliminary results
were consistent with the expectation. However, the results of the MANCOVA model still
need to be examined to conclude if the group means of each dependent variable and joint
dependent variables in group 1 were significantly larger than those in group 2.
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Table 8 Descriptive statistics of the four MANCOVA models

G1
T1
G2

G1
T2
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G2

G1
T3
G2

T4 G1

DV1

DV2

C1

C2

C3-A

C3-B

C4

C5_M

C5_W

C5_S

C5_N

23

23

1

23

23

23

17

23

23

23

23

Mean

53.892

60.012

6.031

0.216

0.184

0.058

-956.468

0.087

0.348

0.565

0.000

S.D.

64.724

65.993

_

0.256

0.279

0.115

977.244

0.288

0.487

0.507

0.000

92

92

36

92

92

92

72

92

92

92

92

Mean

12.235

18.943

20.562

0.083

0.111

0.038

-938.769

0.326

0.348

0.174

0.152

S.D.

23.584

24.464

11.873

0.075

0.269

0.083

976.174

0.471

0.479

0.381

0.361

23

23

1

23

23

23

17

23

23

23

23

Mean

53.892

60.012

6.031

0.216

0.184

0.058

-956.468

0.087

0.348

0.565

0.000

S.D.

64.724

65.993

_

0.256

0.279

0.115

977.244

0.288

0.487

0.507

0.000

142

142

55

142

142

142

113

142

142

142

142

Mean

12.941

19.413

19.632

0.087

0.094

0.034

-948.354

0.331

0.366

0.190

0.113

S.D.

23.335

24.068

11.4198

0.077

0.252

0.107

1082.742

0.472

0.484

0.394

0.317

95

95

22

95

93

93

82

95

95

95

95

Mean

32.985

38.621

20.235

0.141

0.113

0.031

-758.659

0.053

0.611

0.337

0.000

S.D.

57.600

58.061

9.994

0.209

0.289

0.096

944.531

0.225

0.490

0.475

0.000

95

95

37

95

95

95

75

95

95

95

95

Mean

12.202

18.917

20.265

0.083

0.109

0.038

-939.004

0.347

0.337

0.168

0.147

S.D.

23.333

24.150

11.846

0.074

0.265

0.082

971.206

0.479

0.475

0.376

0.356

71

71

13

71

69

69

58

71

71

71

71

39.361

44.580

23.235

0.164

0.132

0.042

-789.117

0.070

0.535

0.394

0.000

N

N

N

N

N

N

N
Mean

S.D.
G2

64.695

65.333

11.476

0.235

0.259

0.081

906.442

0.258

0.502

0.492

0.000

71

71

29

71

71

71

56

71

71

71

71

Mean

9.675

16.1345

20.9275

0.074

0.102

0.035

-893.844

0.366

0.310

0.141

0.183

S.D.

21.017

22.032

12.531

0.065

0.279

0.085

1009.816

0.485

0.466

0.350

0.390

N
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Note:
T1: Threshold which used 0 and the mean of P/1000R to form the two groups (see figure 8)
T2: Threshold which used 0 and the median of P/1000R to form the two groups (see figure 8)
T3: Threshold which used top one-third and bottom one-third of municipalities to form the two groups (see figure 8)
T4: Threshold which used top one-fourth and bottom one-fourth of municipalities to form the two groups (see figure 8)
G1: Low-poverty municipalities with no/few low-income affordable housing program participants
G2: Low-poverty municipalities with many low-income affordable housing program participants
DV1: The percentage of the non-poor population change between 2000 and 2012
DV2: The percentage of the total population change between 2000 and 2012
C1: The percentage of population with long travel time (longer than 30 minutes) in 2005
C2: The construction of new housing units from 2000 to 2012/ population in 2000
C3-A: The change of non-white/white composition between 2000 and 2012
C3-B: The change of black/white composition between 2000 and 2012
C4: The change of crime rate between 2000 and 2012
C5: Region— C5_M means Midwest; C5_W means West; C5_S means South; C5_N means Northeast.

2.2 Correlations
Table 9 shows Pearson correlation coefficients between covariates, dependent
variables, and groups (the independent variable). This section first examines the direction
of each variable and then mainly discusses the correlation between each covariate and the
dependent variables and between each covariate and groups in order to select appropriate
covariates for MANCOVA models.
The directions of the association between all variables and the dependent variables
were consistent with expectations but not all covariates45 had significant correlations
with the dependent variables. Only groups (the independent variable), housing supply
(C2), the change of crime rate (C4), and region (C5) were highly correlated with both
dependent variables. The significant negative correlation between groups and the
dependent variables accorded with the expectation that affordable housing program
participants had negative impacts on the non-poor population change and total population
change. The significant positive correlation between housing supply (C2) and both
dependent variables showed that the more new housing units provided during 2000 and
2012, the higher the population growth. The increase of crime rate from 2000 to 2012 (C4)
negatively correlated with both dependent variables, indicating that the increase of crime
rate had negative impacts on population growth. Region (C5) also significantly correlated
with both dependent variables and the direction of its dummy variables (C5_M, C5_W,
C5_S, C5_N) were consistent with the previous finding based on the five-decade data
45

The percentage of population with long travel time (C1) and the racial/ethnic composition (C3-A and
C3-B) were not significantly correlated with the dependent variables. The negative correlation between the
percentage of population with long travel time (C1) and both dependent variables indicated that the higher
percentage of population with long travel time, the less likelihood of population growth. The change of
non-white/white composition between 2000 and 2012 (C3-A) was negatively correlated with both
dependent variables. The change of black/white composition between 2000 and 2012 (C3-B) was
negatively correlated with non-poor population growth (DV1) but positively correlated with total
population growth (DV2). All these correlations were not statistically significant.
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from 1950s to 1990s (Johnson, et al., 2005).
These three covariates (C2, C4, and C5), which were significantly correlated to the
dependent variables, were considered to be included in the MANCOVA models after the
correlations between these covariates and groups (the independent variable) were
examined. A MANCOVA model with covariates that significantly correlated with groups
cannot fully show the group differences on the dependent variables because parts of the
impact of groups on the dependent variables would be diminished when the model
removes the impact of covariates on the dependent variables. Table 9 shows that, among
the three covariates (C2, C4, and C5), only the change of crime rate (C4) was not
significantly correlated with groups (p > .05). However, if housing supply (C2) and
region (C5) were not included in the models, the research cannot confidently conclude
that affordable housing programs had significant impacts on population change even if
the models show significant group differences because the significance comes from not
only groups but also housing supply (C2) and region (C5). Therefore, all three covariates
were included, mindful that the real impact of the groups on the dependent variables is
stronger than the models show. (Note: Only three dummy variables for region (C5)46
were included in the MANCOVA models.)

46

Since there are four regions, only three dummy variables need to be included in the MANCOVA models.
Table 9 shows only Midwest, South, and North were significantly correlated with the dependent variables.
Thus, the three dummy variables would be these three regions.
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Table 9 Correlation matrix (two-sided P-value)
DV1

DV2

G _T1

G _T2

G _T3

G _T4

1

.991**

-.428**

-.405**

-.231**

-.297**

DV2: The percentage of the total population change

.991**

1

-.414**

-.394**

-.217**

-.282**

G_T1: Groups (formed by using threshold 1)

-.428**

-.414**

1

1.000**

1.000**

1.000**

G_T2: Groups (formed by using threshold 2)

-.405**

-.394**

1.000**

1

1.000**

1.000**

G_T3: Groups (formed by using threshold 3)

-.231**

-.217**

1.000**

1.000**

1

1.000**

G_T4: Groups (formed by using threshold 4)

-.297**

-.282**

1.000**

1.000**

1.000**

1

-.129

-.183

.200

.159

.001

-.089

.958**

.968**

-.379**

-.358**

-.182*

-.255**

C3-A: The change of non-white/white composition

-.026

-.025

-.107

-.121

-.006

-.054

C3-B: The change of black/white composition

-.001

.021

-.086

-.061

.039

-.040

C4: The change of crime rate

-.134*

-.152*

.007

.003

-.094

-.055

C5_M: Region_ Midwest

-.177**

-.165**

.213*

.185*

.368**

.358**

C5_W: Region_ West

.072

.067

.000

.013

-.274**

-.228**

C5_S: Region_ South

.163**

.164**

-.360**

-.303**

-.194**

-.286**

C5_N: Region_ Northeast

-.137*

-.149*

.186*

.132

.282**

.317**

DV1: The percentage of the non-poor population change

C1: The percentage of population with long travel time
C2: Housing supply during 2000 and 2012/ population in 2000
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Note: *. Significant at the .05 level
**. Significant at the .01 level

2.3 Reexamine sample size
After including the three covariates, the sample size of each group changed because
not every municipality has valid values on the three covariates (C2, C4, and C5). Only
municipalities with valid values on the dependent variables (DV1 and DV2), groups,
housing supply (C2), the change of crime rate (C4), and region (C5) were included in the
models. Each of the four MANCOVA models includes the same dependent variables and
the three covariates, but the two groups in each model were formed by using a different
threshold. Table 10 shows the group sample size of the four models.

Table 10 Group sample size before and after including covariates
Original N
MANCOVA_T1
MANCOVA_T2
MANCOVA_T3
MANCOVA_T4

Valid N

Group 1

23

17

Group 2

92

72

Group 1

23

17

Group 2

142

113

Group 1

95

82

Group 2

95

75

Group 1

71

58

Group 2

71

56

The more variables are in a model, the larger overall sample size is required to run
the model. Equation 23 shows the rule of thumb of the maximum number of covariates
(Hair et al., 2010: 457). Based on this equation, a MANCOVA model with two groups
and three covariates requires 40 overall sample size47. Overall sample size includes the

47

Number of covariates≦ (.10 × Overall sample size)- (Number of groups－ 1)
=> 3≦ (.10 × Overall sample size)- (2－ 1)
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sample in both groups. All four models have enough observations for analysis.
Number of covariates≦ (.10 × Overall sample size)- (Number of groups－ 1)

(23)

2.4 Tests of MANCOVA assumptions
Table 11 shows the test results of MANCOVA assumptions of the four models. The
first model (MANCOVA_T1) violates the assumption of normality and the assumption of
homogeneous regression hyperplanes. Although both Levene’s tests reject the null
hypothesis of equal variance on each dependent variable across groups (p < .05), Box’s M
test retains the null hypothesis of equal covariance on joint dependent variables across
groups (p > .05). All Shapiro-Wilk’s W tests reject the null hypothesis that each
dependent variable was normally distributed within each group (p < .05). Since the
sample size in group 1 is small, violation of the normality assumption may make the
results of MANCOVA analysis unreliable. This model also violates the assumption of
homogeneous regression hyperplanes (p < .05). Thus, the first model may not be
appropriate for analysis.
The second model (MANCOVA_T2) violates all three assumptions. Not only that
both Levene’s tests reject the null hypothesis of equal variance on each dependent
variable across groups (p < .05), but also that Box’s M test rejects the null hypothesis of
equal covariance on joint dependent variables across groups (p < .05). The research
further examined the generalized variances for the two groups to evaluate the effect of
this inequality of covariance on the model. Since the larger generalized variance is

=> 3≦ (.10 × Overall sample size)- 1
=> 4≦ (.10 × Overall sample size)
=> 40≦ Overall sample size
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associated with the group with a smaller sample size48, the result of the model tends to be
liberal, which means the model tends to overestimate the difference across groups. Thus,
even if significant group differences were found, it is uncertain whether the dependent
variables were actually significantly different across groups because the significance may
come from the overestimation. All Shapiro-Wilk’s W tests reject the null hypothesis of
normality (p < .05). With a small sample size in group 1, this violation makes the results
even more unreliable. The assumption of homogeneous regression hyperplanes is also
violated (p < .05). Thus, the results of the second model are not reliable.
The third model (MANCOVA_T3) seems to be a reliable model. Both Levene’s tests
retain the null hypothesis of equal variance on each dependent variable across groups (p
> .05). Moreover, although Box’s M test rejects the null hypothesis of equal covariance
on joint dependent variables across groups (p < .05), the generalized variances for the two
groups 49 show that the violation of equal covariance makes the model tend to
underestimate the difference across groups. Thus, if significant group differences were
found, this result is reliable because, although the group differences are underestimated,
the group differences are still significant enough to show on the result. As to the
assumption of normality, although all Shapiro-Wilk’s W tests show the violation of
normality (p < .05), with large sample sizes50 in both groups, the research can further
examine kurtosis to evaluate if the impact of nonnormality on the model is troublesome.
All 95% confidence intervals of kurtosis are positive, which means the distributions of
each dependent variable in each group are leptokurtosis rather than platykurtosis. Thus,
48

The generalized variance for group 1 is larger than that for group 2 (224683> 11357) and group 1 is the
group with a smaller sample size than group 2 (17< 113).
49
Since the group with the larger generalized variance (102441> 10893), namely group 1, is the group
with a larger sample size (82> 75), the statistic power of the model would be underestimated.
50
Based on Central Limit Theorem, large sample size is defined as a sample size larger than 30.
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nonnormality has little effect on this model. This model retains the assumption of
homogeneous regression hyperplanes (p > .05). Overall, the result of this model, although
underestimated, is reliable.
The fourth model (MANCOVA_T4) violates the assumption of homogeneous
regression hyperplanes. Like the third model, both Levene’s tests retain the null
hypothesis of equal variance on each dependent variable across groups (p > .05).
Although Box’s M test shows the violation of equal covariance on joint dependent
variables across groups (p < .05), the generalized variances for the two groups51 show
that this violation makes the model tend to be conservative. Thus, if the model shows
significant group differences, the result is reliable. As to the assumption of normality,
although all Shapiro-Wilk’s W tests show the violation of normality (p < .05), this
nonnormality has little effect on this model because of its large sample sizes in both
groups and because all 95% confidence intervals of kurtosis indicate that the distributions
of each dependent variable in each group are leptokurtosis rather than platykurtosis. Even
though the violations of equal covariance and normality have little effect on this model,
the model violates the assumption of homogeneous regression hyperplanes (p < .05),
which may bias the result. Thus, this model is also inappropriate for analysis.

51

Since the larger generalized variance is associated with the group with a larger sample size, the statistic
power of the model will be underestimated. (The generalized variance for group 1 is larger than that for the
other group and group 1 is the group with a larger sample size.)
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Table 11 Tests of MANCOVA assumptions
MANCOVA_T1 MANCOVA_T2

MANCOVA_T3

MANCOVA_T4

Sample size of each group

G1: 17
G2: 72

G1: 17
G2: 113

G1: 82
G2: 75

G1: 58
G2: 56

Equal variance/ Levene_ DV1
covariance
Levene_ DV2
matrices
Box_Joint DVs

p= .000**

p= .000**

p= .086

p= .092

p= .008**

p= .002**

p= .087

p= .134

p= .083

p= .040*

p= .000**

p= .000**

Generalized variance for
groups

_

G1: 224683.2
G2: 11357.7
overestimate

G1: 102441.1
G2: 10893.4
underestimate

G1: 112676.8
G2: 9611.9
underestimate

Shapiro-Wilk_DV1_G1

p= .000**

p= .000**

p= .000**

p= .000**

Shapiro-Wilk_DV1_G2

p= .000**

p= .000**

p= .000**

p= .000**

Shapiro-Wilk_DV2_G1

p= .000**

p= .000**

p= .000**

p= .000**

Shapiro-Wilk_DV2_G2

p= .000**

p= .000**

p= .000**

p= .000**

95% C.I. of Kurtosis _DV1_G1 (6.070, 9.735)

(6.070, 9.735)

(9.151, 11.072)

(5.997, 8.204)

95% C.I. of Kurtosis _DV1_G2 (7.034, 8.987)

(4.838, 6.421)

(7.166, 9.087)

(12.484, 14.691)

95% C.I. of Kurtosis _DV2_G1 (5.101, 8.766)

(5.101, 8.766)

(8.746, 10.667)

(5.677, 7.884)

95% C.I. of Kurtosis _DV2_G2 (7.498, 9.451)

(5.508, 7.091)

(7.733, 9.654)

(13.083, 15.290)

Distribution

leptokurtosis

leptokurtosis

leptokurtosis

leptokurtosis

p= .021*

p= .023*

p= .131

p= .005**

Normality
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Homogeneous regression hyperplanes
Note: *. Significant at the .05 level
**. Significant at the .01 level

2.5 Results of the MANCOVA model
Considering that researchers must limit their conclusions to only the model that
conforms to the assumptions of the statistical models they choose, this section only
reports the results from the third model (MANCOVA_T3)—the model with the two
dependent variable, three covariates (C2, C4, and C5), and groups formed by using the
third threshold (T3). Results of multivariate and univariate tests are reported respectively.

2.5.1 Multivariate test: Group differences in joint dependent variables
Table 12 indicates that, after controlling for housing supply (C2), the change of
crime rate (C4), and region (C5), the model shows that the percentage of population
changes between 2000 and 2012 (joint dependent variables) was significantly different (p
< .05) between low-poverty municipalities with no/fewer affordable housing program
participants (G1) and low-poverty municipalities with more affordable housing program
participants (G2). The effect size η2 shows that the proportion of variance explained in
the joint dependent variables by groups is 5.5 %. Cohen (1977) has referred to effects of
this magnitude as small to medium in size52. However, as explained in the previous
sections, the effect size of groups was underestimated because the model included the
covariates with high correlations with the groups—housing supply (C2) and region (C5),
and because the violation of equal covariance in this model tends to underestimate group
differences. Fortunately, although underestimated, the result still shows a significant
group difference. And the observed power indicates 74.8% chance of correctly rejecting
the false null hypothesis.

52

Cohen (1977) characterized η2= 0.01 as small, η2= 0.06 as medium, η2= 0.14 as a large effect size.
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Table 12 Multivariate results on the percentage of population change (2000- 2012)
Value

F

Hypothesis df

Error df

Sig.

η2

Observed power*

149

.014

.055

.748

Wilks’ Λ .945 4.367
2
*
Note: Computed using alpha = .05

2.5.2 Univariate test: Group differences in each dependent variable
When running MANCOVA, SPSS also produces univariate results (ANCOVA),
which test group differences on each dependent variable. The following presents the
adjusted group means of each dependent variable and the univariate ANCOVA results.
Table 13 shows the group means of each dependent variable before and after the
group means were adjusted for the three selected covariates (C2, C4, or C5). The adjusted
means show that the non-poor population change from 2000 to 2012 (DV1) in group 1
increased about 23.4% while that in group 2 increased about only 17.9%. Also, the total
population change from 2000 to 2012 (DV2) in group 1 increased about 28.6% while that
in group 2 increased about only 24.7%. The group means of both dependent variables
show a similar pattern that population growth in low-poverty municipalities with no/few
affordable housing program participants (G1) increased more than that in low-poverty
municipalities with many affordable housing program participants (G2).
Table 13 Unadjusted and adjusted group means of the percentage of population change
DV1: Non-poor population change (%) DV2: Total population change (%)
Unadjusted mean53

Adjusted mean

G1

29.01477

23.44383

34.26794

28.56370

G2

12.27981

17.85075

18.98517

24.68941

53

Unadjusted mean Adjusted mean

The unadjusted means in this table are different from the means shown in table 8 because municipalities
without valid values on the selected covariates (C2, C4, or C5) had been excluded. Thus, although both
tables show unadjusted group means, the numbers may not be the same.
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Table 14 shows the results of univariate tests on the two dependent variables. Both
tests are significant (p < .05), indicating that the pattern of group differences shown in
table 13 is significant. The effect size η2 shows that group differences can explain a
greater proportion of variance on non-poor population change (5.1%) than on total
population change (3%). The magnitude of both effect sizes is small to medium (Cohen,
1977) but the actual magnitude is larger than the model shows. (The underestimated
effect sizes are due to the covariates with high correlations with the groups and due to the
violation of equal covariance.) The observed power indicates 80.6% chance of correctly
rejecting a false null hypothesis of no group difference on non-poor population change
and 57.2% chance of correctly rejecting a false null hypothesis of no group difference on
total population change.

Table 14 Univariate results on each dependent variable

DV1

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

η2

Observed Power*

881.452

1

881.452

8.079

.005

.051

.806

DV2
422.940
1
422.940
4.639
.033 .030
.572
*
Note: Computed using alpha = .05
DV1: The percentage of the non-poor population change between 2000 and 2012
DV2: The percentage of the total population change between 2000 and 2012
In sum, the model (MANCOVA_T3), which shows that groups had significant
impacts on joint dependent variables and each individual dependent variable, supports the
main finding from the dynamic economic model. The dynamic economic model indicated
that housing mobility programs, which relocated low-income families to wealthier
localities, may increase the non-poor’s motivation to move out of the receiving
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municipalities because of the effect of property taxation under a decentralized fiscal
system. The economic model shows the non-poor’s motivation while the MANCOVA
model tests the non-poor’s actions. Data showed that affordable housing programs, or, to
be more specific, the in-migration of low-income affordable housing program participants,
significantly affected the percentage of population change between 2000 and 2012 in
low-poverty municipalities. Low-poverty municipalities with more low-income program
participants had a significantly lower percentage of population growth, especially the
non-poor population growth, than the low-poverty municipalities with no/fewer
low-income program participants did.
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Concentrated poverty is among the most serious urban problems in America.
Poverty is more difficult to address when it is spatially concentrated because the
inadequate resources and limited opportunities in poverty-concentrated places decrease
the capacity of low-income families to improve their economic status. Aiming to solve
the problem, housing mobility programs were created to help disperse eligible families
from high-poverty neighborhoods to low-poverty neighborhoods with greater resources
and opportunities so that poverty concentration could be solved and families could attain
economic self-sufficiency in new neighborhoods.
Empirical evidence showed that the duration of time spent living in low-poverty
neighborhoods is one of the key factors that affects the effectiveness of housing mobility
programs. Numerous studies on housing mobility programs found no improvement on
participants’ economic self-sufficiency. Considering that many participants did not
actually move to low-poverty neighborhoods or did not stay in low-poverty
neighborhoods after their one-year leases expired, these studies were interpreted to reveal
the disappointing outcomes of certain housing mobility programs rather than question the
approach of relocating the poor to better neighborhoods. When using duration of time
lived in low-poverty neighborhoods as an independent variable, ClampetLundquist and
Massey (2008) found positive effects on the odds of being employed. This positive

100

finding reflected the fact that housing mobility programs’ mechanisms to improve
economic self-sufficiency required time to take effect.
Considering that the duration effect for housing mobility program participants
depended on both the residential mobility of the poor to move to wealthier neighborhoods
and the willingness of the non-poor to stay in the receiving neighborhoods, the analysis
on housing mobility programs’ impacts on further migration of different economic
classes is essential to reveal whether or not housing mobility programs are effective. If
migration of the non-poor changed the mixed-income environment in the long term, the
positive impacts of mixed-income neighborhoods on individual outcomes of program
participants might not be realized in the long run.
This research argues that fiscal decentralization, which motivates people to vote
with their feet according to Tiebout’s theory, limits the impact of housing mobility
programs. Chapter II described how fiscal decentralization may lead to poverty
concentration. Local governments adopted exclusionary zoning to avoid negative impacts
of the poor’s in-migration on local public finance. Although housing mobility programs
aimed to solve poverty concentration by breaking the barrier of exclusionary zoning,
housing mobility programs did not change fiscal decentralization by compensating
receiving localities to maintain the same level of local financial resources. Therefore, the
influx of low-income families inevitably affected local taxes and public goods in
receiving localities, which may have stimulated further vote-with-feet behavior. If the
wealthier residents out-migrate, the same problem of poverty concentration may be
created in receiving localities and the problem of poverty and poverty concentration may
remain unsolved because low-income families still live in places with limited resources
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and opportunities. Thus, housing mobility programs may have altered the spatial pattern
of poverty, but the policy may not have relieved poverty.
This research created a dynamic economic model of urban migration as a theoretical
model to analyze the impacts of housing mobility programs on the change of local tax
and public goods in both sending and receiving municipalities and the impacts of this
change on further migration of different economic classes. This dynamic model improved
the Tiebout model by adopting property taxation for analysis and allowing people to
relocate in order to reflect externalities. According to this model, housing mobility
programs may decrease the economic surplus of the poor who stay in sending
municipalities, thus enhancing their motivation to move out. With the assistance of
housing mobility programs, more poor people move to receiving municipalities. At the
early stage of the dynamic, both the poor and the non-poor in receiving municipalities
have more economic surplus. However, as more poor people move in to receiving
municipalities in a short term, the change of the non-poor’s economic surplus started to
turn from positive to negative, enhancing the possibility of the non-poor’s out-migration.
The model also predicts that the exodus of wealthier residents may cause three negative
long-term consequences: aggravating the problem of urban sprawl, creating more
municipalities suffering from poverty concentration, and decreasing the economic surplus
of the poor in both sending municipalities and receiving municipalities.
While the economic model serves as a theoretical model, statistical models test the
main finding from the economic model—the impacts of housing mobility programs on
out-migration of wealthier residents. The ANOVA model, using the financial data from
1991, indicated that the non-poor in high-poverty municipalities did not pay more taxes
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for public welfare and health than the non-poor in low-poverty municipalities did. This
finding increases the credibility of the dynamic economic model, which assumes that all
public goods are used and shared by all residents living in the same municipality so the
model only uses nonexclusive public goods for analysis without including exclusive
public goods such as health and welfare. The MANCOVA model is the main model to
test the migration of wealthier residents. Due to the lack of data on out-migration, this
research used the percentage of population change between 2000 and 2012 as
measurement. The MANCOVA results supported the economic model, indicating that the
set of population changes between 2000 and 2012 in low-poverty municipalities with
no/fewer affordable housing program participants increased significantly more than that
in low-poverty municipalities with more affordable housing program participants after
controlling for covariates like housing supply, crime rate, and region. The MANCOVA
model also showed that housing mobility programs had more impact on the variation of
non-poor population change than on that of total population change. Based on the results
of both statistical models, the research suggests that even if the federal government was
willing to provide public welfare and health for low-income persons in receiving
municipalities, the subsidies on nonexclusive public goods through property taxation
from the non-poor to the poor were still powerful enough to affect migration.
The findings may serve as a start for scholars to reexamine the effectiveness of
housing mobility programs in the framework of political fragmentation/ fiscal
decentralization. This research implies that the federal government must consider the
reactions of the non-poor when adopting mobility-based polices. Housing mobility
programs’ dependence on the presence of wealthier residents can be seen from MTO’s
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geographical restriction that housing vouchers could only be used in neighborhoods with
low poverty rates. However, the stability of mixed-income neighborhoods may require
the federal government to change the nature of fiscal decentralization; otherwise, the
individual behavior (the out-migration of the non-poor) under a decentralized fiscal
system may limit the effectiveness of housing mobility programs.
Although this research did not test the impacts of housing mobility programs on
local taxes and public good level in receiving municipalities, the economic model
provides a possible explanation for the outmigration of wealthier residents and previous
research findings about the deterioration of receiving localities and the decreasing
number of neighborhoods with better public goods and job opportunities. This research
shows our limited understanding about the impacts of housing mobility programs. Most
current research about housing mobility programs focused on the impacts on either
participants’ individual outcomes or the conditions of receiving neighborhoods after
participants moved in. However, when analyzing the impacts of housing mobility
programs under a decentralized fiscal system, the economic model surprisingly finds that
housing mobility programs may have wider impacts such as urban sprawl.
Considering that many low-income families have moved to other neighborhoods
through the assistance of housing mobility programs, supporting measures are provided
to prevent or alleviate further problems. Unlike traditional economic models, which are
based on utility maximization and thus make out-migration a sure result and leave no
room for policy suggestions, the dynamic model in this research uses the concept of
“dissatisfaction” for analysis and shows the possibility of adopting supporting measures
to maintain mixed-income environment (see the early stage of the dynamic). Two policy
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suggestions are provided based on the economic model. The first suggestion is to change
the nature of fiscal decentralization by compensating receiving municipalities to maintain
the non-poor’s economic surplus. At the early stage of the dynamic, the non poor stay in
the receiving municipality is because their economic surplus has not decreased. The
MANCOVA results imply that the subsidies through property taxation alone could affect
migration. Thus, the research suggests that the federal government not only pay for the
health and welfare for low-income families but also compensate receiving municipalities
to maintain the same level of tax and public goods.
The second suggestion on the prevention of out-migration is to weaken the effect of
property taxation under a decentralized fiscal system. The federal government can
exacerbate or ease the negative consequences of political fragmentation by widening the
income gap or adopting policies to enhance the poor’s economic status and thus
weakening the effect of property taxation and externalities (see Chapter II). For example,
the federal government may improve the accessibility of public transit from receiving
neighborhoods and job markets. (see Chapter II: A positive relationship between MTO
movers with the access of transportation and employment outcomes was found in
previous research.) The smaller the income gap between the non-poor and the poor, the
fewer subsidies would be transferred from the non-poor to the poor through property
taxation, the less likelihood of out-migration of wealthier residents.
This research supports scholarship that questions housing mobility programs’
effectiveness at improving individual outcomes for two reasons. First, the research
challenges the approach that residential mobility leads to economic mobility. This
approach depends on better neighborhoods with wealthier residents who serve as role
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models, pay taxes for better public goods, and help create jobs to increase the economic
mobility of the poor (see Chapter II). Although this research did not test the effect of
mixed-income neighborhoods on employment outcomes, this research points out that
even if neighborhoods with more wealthier residents do positively affect individual
outcomes, the created mixed-income neighborhoods may not exist in the long run, let
alone have positive impacts on the economic mobility of the poor.
Second, the research reminds urban scholars to rethink the traditional idea that better
neighborhoods lead to better individual outcomes. Is it better neighborhoods that
generates better individual outcomes or is it better individuals, such as high-income
persons who contribute more to local tax revenue54, that provides local governments
financial capacity to create better neighborhoods? If neighborhoods are the causes, not
the outcomes, then why were geographical restrictions on housing vouchers related to
poverty rates of neighborhoods rather than the availability of resources and opportunities
in neighborhoods? A possible explanation may be the assumption that low-poverty
neighborhoods tend to have better resources and that relocating the poor to these
neighborhoods costs less55 than directly providing resources to the poor in where they
live. If this assumption is the reason why low-poverty neighborhoods were considered as
ideal receiving neighborhoods, then perhaps policy makers need to rethink the direction
of causation between higher income residents (low-poverty neighborhoods) and better
neighborhood resources. In a decentralized fiscal system, higher income residents do play
a role in the provision of resources. Thus, the current housing mobility programs may
54

Even though tax rates are low, as long as tax base, like income, is large, local governments can still
receive enough tax to provide better public goods.
55
Chapter II explained why the interlocal competition in a politically fragmented setting tends to lead to
the overprovision of public goods for wealthier people. Thus, the excess capacity of public good in
low-poverty localities may save federal funds for providing resources to the poor.
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rely more on wealthier-individual effects rather than neighborhood effects. If individuals
are the cause of neighborhoods, current housing mobility programs may fail to adopt
supporting measures to either keep wealthier residents or improve the employment
outcomes of the poor. If individuals are the main cause, then perhaps policy makers
should focus on thinking how to actually help low-income persons to escape from
poverty rather than relying on poorly understood mobility-based solutions.
The most important implication of this research is that anti-poverty programs should
be funded at the federal level rather than at a local level for practical and equity reasons.
For the practical reason, funding anti-poverty programs at the local level rather than the
national level may stimulate the out-migration of wealthier residents. Once wealthier
residents out-migrate to avoid being taxed for anti-poverty programs, there may not be
enough tax revenues to implement those programs. Solutions to poverty may be local56
but the resources for the solutions should be federal. Although housing mobility programs
are federal policies, the policies depend on local resources to solve poverty. Thus,
wealthier residents may exit the newly mixed-income municipalities, poverty may
re-concentrate, and housing mobility programs may not achieve the policy goals.
The equity reason is that it may be unfair to ask the people who happen to be
neighbors with the poor to pay for anti-poverty solutions rather than all citizens in the
nation. Some scholars may argue against the practical reason based on the fact that not all
non-poor persons are mobile so the out-migration may be much less than the model
predicts. While that may be true, would it be fair to collect resources for solving poverty
from the non-poor who lack economic mobility to out-migrate to avoid paying subsidies
56

Although poverty may be a common problem for many municipalities in America, there may be some
differences in different local contexts. Therefore, it is reasonable that solutions come from local
governments.
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to the poor through property taxation? Funding anti-poverty programs at a local level
may create an inequality between the non-poor with low economic mobility and the
non-poor with high economic mobility. This research suggested that compensation for
receiving localities is needed to maintain mixed-income environment and the
compensation should come from the federal government. This policy suggestion is also
based on the equity reason that the resources for solving poverty should not come from
local residents, especially the non-poor with low economic mobility.
This research limits the analysis to an economic perspective. The dynamic economic
model assumes that only economic incentive influences relocation behavior. However,
there are many non-economic reasons for relocation. The MANCOVA model in this
research intended to control these non-economic factors by including covariates, but it
only included the factors that can be quantified. This limitation means that other equally
important non-economic motives would be ignored in this research. This research
acknowledges non-economic motives for relocation but limits the analysis to economic
factors only. The policy suggestions were also based on an economic perspective. It is
possible that even if the federal government compensates receiving municipalities,
wealthier residents still out-migrate due to other non-economic reasons.
There are some suggestions for future studies to improve this research. First, future
research can gather data on out-migration instead of using population changes to test
housing mobility programs’ impact on migration. Second, based on this research’s
finding, future research can test the relationships between housing mobility programs and
the three negative consequences predicted by the dynamic economic model. Third, the
economic model in this research shows the dynamic process of migration, but it cannot
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predict when the out-migration will occur. Future research may explore factors affecting
the length of the dynamic such as the access capacity of public goods in receiving
municipalities, how poor the program participants are, the non-poor population in
receiving municipalities, and other possible factors. The information may be useful to
provide more concrete policy suggestions on how to maintain the early stage of the
dynamic at which mixed-income status is stable. Fourth, future research may compare the
individual outcomes of housing mobility programs in America with that in another
country which adopted similar policies under a centralized fiscal system.
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APPENDIX 1: ALGEBRAS USED IN THE DYNAMIC ECONOMIC MODEL

Demand Curve


Dp: The demand curve of the poor



Dr: The demand curve of the non-poor

Population


Np0: The number of the poor in the sending municipality before housing mobility
programs were adopted



Np1: The number of the poor who move from the sending municipality to the
receiving municipality through housing mobility programs



Np2: The tipping point of the poor program participants which starts to cause the
out-migration of the non-poor in the receiving municipality



Nr0: The number of the non-poor in the receiving municipality before housing
mobility programs were adopted

Shared Cost (SC)


Cp0: The shared cost of the poor in the sending municipality before housing mobility
programs were adopted



Cp1: The shared cost of the poor in the sending municipality after some other poor
persons move out to the receiving municipality through housing mobility programs



Cp2: The shared cost of the poor after they move to the receiving municipality
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through housing mobility programs


Cp3: The shared cost of the poor in the sending municipality after further
out-migration of the poor in the sending municipality



Cp4: The shared cost of the poor in the receiving municipality after the out-migration
of the non-poor in the receiving municipality



Cr0: The shared cost of the non-poor in the receiving municipality before housing
mobility programs were adopted



Cr1: The shared cost of the non-poor in the receiving municipality after some poor
persons move in to the receiving municipality through housing mobility programs

Quantity of public goods


Zp0: The poor’s optimal quantity of public goods in the sending municipality before
housing mobility programs were adopted



Zp1: The poor’s optimal quantity of public goods in the sending municipality after
housing mobility programs were adopted



Zr0. The non-poor’s optimal quantity of public goods in the receiving municipality
before housing mobility programs were adopted



Zr1. The non-poor’s optimal quantity of public goods in the receiving municipality
after housing mobility programs were adopted

Others


P: The price of a unit of public good
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APPENDIX 2: POVERTY THRESHOLDS FOR 1990, 2000, 2012

The Census Bureau uses a set of income thresholds that vary by family size, age of
householder, and number of related children under 18 present to determine who is in
poverty. This appendix shows the poverty thresholds for 1990, 2000, and 2012
respectively.
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Table 15 Poverty thresholds for 1990

Size of family unit
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One person (unrelated individual)
Under 65 years
65 years and over
Two people
Householder under 65 years
Householder 65 years and over
Three people
Four people
Five people
Six people
Seven people
Eight people
Nine people or more

Weighted
average
thresholds
$6,652
6,800
6,268
8,509
8,794
7,905
10,419
13,359
15,792
17,839
20,241
22,582
26,848

Related children under 18 years
None

One

Two

Three

Four

Five

Six

Seven

9,009
8,975
10,520
13,701
16,494
18,773
21,650
24,276
29,087

10,530
13,254
15,989
18,386
21,187
23,839
28,700

13,301
15,598
18,015
20,864
23,456
28,375

15,359
17,464
20,262
22,913
27,842

17,137
19,561
22,223
27,108

18,791
21,505
26,445

21,323
26,280

Eight
or
more

6,800
6,268
8,752
7,900
10,223
13,481
16,257
18,699
21,515
24,063
28,946

Source: The Census Bureau: https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/threshld/

25,268

Table 16 Poverty thresholds for 2000

Size of family unit
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One person (unrelated individual)
Under 65 years
65 years and over
Two people
Householder under 65 years
Householder 65 years and over
Three people
Four people
Five people
Six people
Seven people
Eight people
Nine people or more

Weighted
average
thresholds
$8,794
8,959
8,259
11,239
11,590
10,419
13,738
17,603
20,819
23,528
26,753
29,701
35,060

Related children under 18 years
None

One

Two

Three

Four

Five

Six

Seven

11,869
11,824
13,861
18,052
21,731
24,734
28,524
31,984
38,322

13,874
17,463
21,065
24,224
27,914
31,408
37,813

17,524
20,550
23,736
27,489
30,904
37,385

20,236
23,009
26,696
30,188
36,682

22,579
25,772
29,279
35,716

24,758
28,334
34,841

28,093
34,625

Eight
or
more

8,959
8,259
11,531
10,409
13,470
17,761
21,419
24,636
28,347
31,704
38,138

Source: The Census Bureau: https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/threshld/

33,291

Table 17 Poverty thresholds for 2012

Size of family unit
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One person (unrelated individual)
Under 65 years
65 years and over
Two people
Householder under 65 years
Householder 65 years and over
Three people
Four people
Five people
Six people
Seven people
Eight people
Nine people or more

Weighted
average
thresholds
$11,720
11,945
11,011
14,937
15,450
13,892
18,284
23,492
27,827
31,471
35,473
39,688
47,297

Related children under 18 years
None

One

Two

Three

Four

Five

Six

Seven

23,364
27,400
31,647
36,651
41,204
49,845

26,981
30,678
35,594
40,249
48,908

30,104
34,362
39,038
47,620

33,009
37,777
46,454

37,457
46,165

Eight
or
more

11,945
11,011
15,374
13,878
17,959
23,681
28,558
32,847
37,795
42,271
50,849

15,825
15,765
18,480 18,498
24,069 23,283
28,974 28,087
32,978 32,298
38,031 37,217
42,644 41,876
51,095 50,416

Source: The Census Bureau: https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/threshld/

44,387

APPENDIX 3: GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF MUNICIPALITIES

This appendix includes the geographic distribution of each group of municipalities
used for analysis. Figure 9 includes 15 low-poverty municipalities (below 15 percent) and
9 high-poverty municipalities (above 25 percent), which had the financial data needed to
calculate the dependent variable of the ANOVA model.
MANCOVA models used four different thresholds of P/1000R (the number of poor
program participants every 1000 non-poor persons have to take care of) (see figure 8) to
select two groups of municipalities from the 284 low-poverty municipalities (below 15
percent), which had a 2000 population of 65,000 or more and experienced no boundary
changes or HOPE VI programs during the time from 2000 to 2012. Figure 10 shows the
geographic distribution of the two groups of municipalities formed by threshold 1,
including 23 low-poverty municipalities in group 1 and 92 low-poverty municipalities in
group 2. Figure 11 shows the geographic distribution of the two groups of municipalities
formed by threshold 2, including 23 low-poverty municipalities in group 1 and 142
low-poverty municipalities in group 2. Figure 12 shows the geographic distribution of the
two groups of municipalities formed by threshold 3, including 95 low-poverty
municipalities in each of the two groups. Figure 13 shows the geographic distribution of
the two groups of municipalities formed by threshold 4, including 71 low-poverty
municipalities in each of the two groups.

125

126

Figure 9 Geographic distribution of the two groups of municipalities used for the ANOVA analysis
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Figure 10 Geographic distribution of the two groups of municipalities formed by threshold 1
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Figure 11 Geographic distribution of the two groups of municipalities formed by threshold 2
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Figure 12 Geographic distribution of the two groups of municipalities formed by threshold 3
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Figure 13 Geographic distribution of the two groups of municipalities formed by threshold 4
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